The Governance of Britain
Review of Voting Systems: The experience of new voting systems in the United Kingdom since 1997
© Crown Copyright 2008
Foreword by the Secretary of State
In July 2007 the Government published the Governance
of Britain Green Paper, which outlined proposals for a new
and deeper phase of constitutional renewal, and included
a commitment to complete and publish this Review of
Voting Systems.
This followed a manifesto commitment to review the
experience of the electoral systems introduced for the
devolved administrations, the European Parliament and the
London Mayor and Assembly.
Since these systems were set up there have been three elections in Wales, Scotland,
and Northern Ireland, and two elections for the European Parliament, London Mayor
and Greater London Assembly.
There is therefore a wealth of information on the practical operation of different
forms of voting systems within the United Kingdom, which this Review has been
able to draw upon. In addition, the Review refers to the findings of studies of electoral
systems in other democracies.
The Review does not make any recommendations for reform but describes the
strengths and weaknesses of different voting systems to inform the continuing
debate on electoral reform.
Rt Hon Jack Straw MP
Lord Chancellor
and Secretary of State for Justice
Terms of reference for the voting systems review
To provide a summary of the available evidence from the following:
1. voting systems used in the UK for the National Assembly for Wales, the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the European Parliament, the Greater London Assembly, and the London Mayoral elections
2. international experiences of voting systems, which mirror those used in the UK
3. the findings of the Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting
system (Jenkins Commission, 1998)1
4. the report of the Independent Commission on Proportional Representation
(ICPR, 2003) established at the Constitution Unit at University College of
London
5.
those parts of the Power Inquiry an independent inquiry established in 2004
and chaired by Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws, that considered issues around
electoral systems
6. the findings of the Richard Commission in Wales
and the Arbuthnott
Commission in Scotland.
Executive Summary
This review is a desk-based study, drawing upon previous reviews of voting
systems, academic papers, books and other resources. The cut-off date for the
collection of information in this review was 31 October 2007.
systems, academic papers, books and other resources. The cut-off date for the
collection of information in this review was 31 October 2007.
The principal remit of this review is to describe the experience of the new
voting systems in the UK — for the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly,
Northern Ireland Assembly, London Assembly, London Mayor and the European
Parliament. The experiences are drawn together under commonly used criteria
for assessing the performance and characteristics of different voting systems.
This review also includes the experiences of some relevant international
examples that have comparable voting systems.
The purpose of this review is to contribute to the knowledge base and debate
on whether or not changes should be made to the voting system for the
House of Commons. We have set out to provide, as much as possible, objective
information to contribute to this debate but not to make judgements or
recommendations that are inherently political in nature. We understand
that this review may receive comments from many sides and we welcome
contributions to a healthy debate.
The study and analysis of voting systems does not always produce conclusive
findings. Comparing voting systems is inherently a political task and the debate
will present differing views. Attitudes towards different voting systems can
be highly influenced by a system's impact on groups or parties that a person
supports or opposes. Opinions, and to some extent the interpretations of
research findings, may also reflect the values different people place on certain
properties and characteristics of voting models and the resulting nature of
representative democracy.
Previous reviews
Since 1997 there have been several different reviews of voting systems.
The Independent Commission on the Voting System (Jenkins Commission,
1998), tasked with recommending a system for Westminster, proposed a
change from the current First Past the Post System (FPTP) to Alternative Vote
Plus (AV+). This was a new model with a preferential voting system including
a top-up list vote to ensure reasonable proportionality. The Commission took
the view that this would extend voter choice and maintain a link between
constituents and representatives.
The Arbuthnott Commission for Scotland (2006) recommended that the
Additional Member System (AMS) should be retained for the Scottish
Parliament but revised in terms of the language used, ballot paper design
and the introduction of open lists. It also suggested that Scottish Parliament
elections and local government elections should not be on the same day and
recommended the use of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) for the European
Parliamentary elections in Scotland. The Richard Commission8 for Wales (2004)
favoured changing the voting system to STV for the Welsh Assembly if the size
of the Assembly were to be increased.
The Independent Commission to review Britain's experience of Proportional
Representation Voting Systems in the UK (ICPR, 2003)9 did not propose a
particular voting system, but it observed that changing the voting system for
the House of Commons would have far-reaching effects (notably, coalition
government). The ICPR also observed that the introduction of new voting
systems elsewhere in the UK has not had as dramatic an impact as either
proponents or opponents of change had suggested. In general, the new bodies
elected under proportional representation (PR) have produced stable, if not
always popular, government.
The Power Commission (2004)
recommended that the current voting system
for Westminster be replaced with a more "responsive electoral system" but gave
no firm views on which system would best achieve this.
The Electoral Reform Society's (ERS)
review of the new voting systems
introduced for the UK (2007) critiques the FPTP system and recommends
STV as a suitable system for Westminster. While recognising that the causes
of political disengagement are very complex, the ERS argue there is a strong
link between the type of voting system and voter turn-out. For the devolved
jurisdiction, the ERS recommend that STV be introduced in Scotland, Wales,
the London Assembly and the European elections and that the Alternative Vote
System (AV) be introduced for the London Mayor.
Experience of the new voting systems
The choice of the new voting systems introduced in the UK reflects specific
devolved functions, geographical contexts, and the political climates of the
time and regions. These systems have also only been in place for between two
and three terms and may still be undergoing a fine-tuning process. This should
be considered when comparisons are made with the different history and
functions of the House of Commons.
The Additional Member System (AMS) for the National Assembly for Wales
resulted in an initial minority Labour Government, followed by a coalition with
the Liberal Democrats until 2003, a minority Labour government until 2007,
and most recently the formation of a Labour-Plaid Cymru Alliance following the
2007 elections. Labour has dominated the constituency elections. The regional
list system has allowed much stronger representation for Plaid Cymru, the
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats.
AMS for the Scottish Parliament resulted in a coalition government between
Labour and the Liberal Democrats between 1999 and 2003. The 2007 election
resulted in a Scottish National Party minority administration with support
from the Scottish Greens. The regional list system has allowed significant
representation in the Scottish Parliament for the Scottish National Party,
Conservatives, Scottish Greens, Scottish Socialists and independent candidates.
A difficult issue in both Scotland and Wales has been the friction between
constituency members and list members. Part of the issue has been the fact
that unsuccessful candidates for constituency seats can be elected through
the list. The tensions have been exacerbated by the fact that list members
are mainly from opposition parties. Other countries with AMS, like Germany
and, since 1996, New Zealand, have not experienced the same problem. The
Government of Wales Act 2006 ended "dual candidacy" in Wales.
STV for the Northern Ireland Assembly has led to the most proportional
distribution of seats in any UK election. Four large parties have tended
to dominate, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn Fein, the Social
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The most
recent election saw the DUP and Sinn Fein emerge as the two leading parties in
terms of vote share.
AMS for the London Assembly helped the Liberal Democrats, Greens and UK
Independence Party (UKIP) secure seats in the Assembly through the list. All
constituency seats have been won by Labour or the Conservative party. In the
London Mayoral elections second preference votes, under the Supplementary
Vote (SV) system, have helped to decide the outcome of both the 2000 and
2004 elections. Complexity of the ballot papers has been a particular problem
in the London elections, especially in 2004, when the Assembly and Mayoral
elections were combined with the European Parliamentary elections.
The closed list system, employed in the European Parliamentary elections in
Great Britain since 1999, has enabled much stronger representation for the
Liberal Democrats, and seats for the Greens and in 2004, UKIP. Labour's share
of the seats in 2004 was 24 percent, compared with 71 percent in the last FPTP
election in 1994.
Turn-out in all of these elections (except Northern Ireland) is considerably
lower than in the UK General election. Turn-out in Scotland and Wales fell
significantly in 2003 compared with 1999. Turn-out rose in the second set of
London and European Parliamentary elections over the period, with a range of
factors, including postal voting and combination of polls, making a contribution.
Electors' perceptions of the relative powers and importance of the elected
bodies may also play a part too.
The Electoral Commission's findings about the elections in Scotland, Wales,
Northern Ireland and for the European Parliament have a common theme
about the need for better information for the public, both about the purpose
and importance of the elections and the processes involved.
Assessing the experience
This review looks at the experience of the new voting systems under seven
criteria, of which the findings are briefly summarised below.
Proportionality
All the newly introduced voting systems have achieved a greater degree of
proportionality than FPTP, although only STV in Northern Ireland has achieved
what academic observers consider to be close to genuine proportionality. While
the FPTP system for Westminster currently favours the Labour Party, it allows
large swings in seats to be won by the two major parties although this is less
predictable with the emergence of a stronger third party, the Liberal Democrats.
Factors other than the voting system impact on disproportionality, in particular
district magnitude and patterns of voter behaviour. While there is a consensus
about the factors contributing to proportionality and disproportionality, there
are different interpretations about which factors are problematic. Some argue
that disproportionality of FPTP is unfair to small parties, in particular for the
Liberal Democrats, and call for a change of the voting system. Others argue
that the disproportionality is a result of several factors: changing patterns of
voter support, turn-out and constituency size, with the voting system not
being the sole cause of disproportionality. Factors that could be influential
include constituency boundaries and voter turn-out. It is clear that PR systems
do introduce a greater degree of proportionality. However debates critiquing
FPTP need to take into account the complex factors, other than just the voting
system, that contribute to disproportionality in recent UK elections.
Voter participation
International evidence suggests that proportional systems have around
five percent higher turn-out but this has not been the experience of the new
systems introduced in the UK. Turn-out is lower in most of the elections
of the devolved jurisdictions and European Parliament when compared to
elections in the House of Commons. Voter turn-out in the elections in Scotland
and Wales under AMS was initially relatively low in 1999, declined in 2003,
but improved slightly in the most recent elections in 2007. London and the
European elections saw improvements in turn-out under the SV, AMS and the
Party List systems in the 2004 elections, although turn-out was still very low
in comparison to other elections. Northern Ireland under STV has seen a slight
decrease in turn-out since 1998.
The General FPTP elections saw a sharp decline in turn-out in 2001 compared
to 1997 with only a slight improvement in 2005. Turn-out in 2001 and 2005
was lowest amongst voters who said they had no interest in politics and who
perceived little difference between parties. Studies show that various social
and demographic factors, such as deprivation and age, may contribute to the
propensity to vote. In the 2005 General election there were indications of rising
inequalities in turn-out (those considered least likely to vote were not turning
out), but perceived voter efficacy (feeling that your vote counts) amongst
those with low levels of knowledge was not found to vary between FPTP and
other voting systems. The causes of turn-out are multiple and complex and it is
difficult to assess the impact of the voting systems in isolation.
Stability and effectiveness of governments
Both PR and FPTP are associated with examples of stable governments in
the UK. FPTP in the UK has tended to produce a clear majority winner with
governments serving full terms. However, coalition government is the most
common form of government under proportional systems in the UK and
most coalitions stay in power for long periods. However, there can be periods
of uncertainty following elections while potential coalition negotiations take
place, particularly when the results are close, such as experienced in Scotland
following the 2007 election. Because PR increases the chances of coalition
government with a greater number of parties involved, this can increase the
chance of instability and more frequent elections or changes of government,
as described further in the international section. Sometimes small parties can
hold the balance of power, although this has not been a dominant feature in
the UK.
While coalition governments can be stable and effective, the
nature of
government formation and policy development is different. There is debate
about the appeal of coalition governments in terms of the effects on parties
and on voters before and during elections and in how governments decide
their policy platforms after elections. Voters may feel they have less influence
on what government is formed as coalitions depend on which parties strike
the governing coalition deal, and the consequential impact on the policy
agenda. FPTP often produces an undisputed winner and can award the winning
party with a surplus of seats to govern without necessarily being dependent
on a coalition. This also demarcates the opposition in Parliament as a clear
alternative to and check on the Government. On the other hand, as pointed
out by the ICPR12, coalitions have led to more policy innovation with the need
to negotiate and obtain consent across represented parties. Views about the
benefits of coalition governments vary. If PR were to be introduced for the
House of Commons it would have far reaching effects in terms of changing the
nature of government formation and policy development.
There has been no shift in public opinion towards PR as a result of the last FPTP
elections of 2005. Survey results from the British Election Study (1992-2005)
of public attitudes show a tension between people agreeing with the merits of
greater proportionality but also being cautious about the consequence of more
small parties being represented in Parliament. 13
Impact on the voter
Voters can exercise more choices under more proportional systems. This
28.
is because voters can vote preferentially, "splitting their ticket" between
constituency and list parties and voting for small parties who are more likely to
win seats.
We do not find, on balance, that any voting system is inherently more
confusing than another for the voter, in terms of casting their votes correctly.
While FPTP is simpler in theory for voters and has lower invalid voting rates,
ease of voting has not been an overwhelming problem in the new systems
when elections are not combined, and taking into account a period for
adjustment. Combined elections increase the levels of invalid votes, although,
given the limitations in the data on invalid voting, it is difficult to assess reliably
the nature of relationships between different combined systems or whether
some are better combined than others. Ballot paper design is an important
factor in voter understanding and in casting votes correctly, as evidenced by
the London Assembly and London Mayoral elections in 2004 and the Scottish
Parliamentary in 2007 elections.
FPTP is considered to have the simplest direct relationship between a single
representative and the constituents who elect them. STV allows constituents a
choice between representatives because there can be multiple representatives
for a constituency from various parties. AMS allows for the direct relationship
between electors and their constituency representative, but the existence of
list representatives, often from different parties, has resulted in competition
between the different categories of representative. However, choice is
enhanced under AMS because a member of the electorate can either approach
one constituency member or any of the regional list members. The closed
party list establishes the lowest level of connection between constituents
and their representative. Whether the connection between constituents
and representatives is stronger under FPTP and STV (both candidate-based
systems) depends on political perspectives about whether single or multiple
representatives are best.
Social representation
Whilst internationally, PR countries tend to do better on female representation,
in the UK, positive action policies has also played a key role. A much higher
proportion of women has been elected to the Scottish, Welsh and London
Assemblies than is the case for the House of Commons (or in Europe and
Northern Ireland). List systems may help, but the driving factor has probably
been the Labour Party's "twinning" arrangement for male and female candidates
in constituency seats in those Assemblies. Women\s representation is poor
in the European Parliament and Northern Ireland despite PR systems being
in place. No voting system in the UK has led to significant improvements in
the representation of black and minority ethnic (BME) groups. Party selection
processes for fielding candidates are much more important for improving social
representation than voting systems.
Political campaigning
There has been relatively little change in the focus of campaigns under the new
voting systems. Although some small parties have been able to take advantage
of strategic campaigning for the list seats under AMS, wider national issues and
traditional constituency-based tactics tend to predominate. The role of UKIP
in the 2004 European Parliamentary elections, and the Greens and Scottish
Socialists in the 2003 Scottish Parliament elections, are exceptions. It may
be that lessons learned from these experiences may lead to more distinctive
approaches from the larger parties in time. Previous reviews reported that
campaigning for General elections in the UK focused on marginal seats but
other research comparing countries with different systems found that more
people reported contact with a political party under FPTP than other voting
systems. It is difficult to draw conclusions from the limited research available
about experience within the UK.
Impact on administration
Changes to voting systems have taken place at the same time as other
innovations and new demands have been placed on electoral administrators
and returning officers, such as increased use of postal voting.
The more complicated count methodologies required for PR elections
(especially STV) can prolong counts. This has increased demand for electronic
counting, which has in turn introduced new technical challenges to the way
elections are traditionally run.
Combined elections and the use of different voting systems increases the
complexity for voters and brings into play the importance of the consistency
of information provided to voters and the design of the ballot papers.
In the current complex environment of multiple jurisdictions, multiple systems
and sometimes combined elections, careful consideration continues to be
required for running elections for devolved jurisdictions. Given the range of
concerns around the need for consistent information, consistent practice
in counts and improved ballot paper design, greater lead-in times would be
needed for elections to facilitate effective planning if changes were proposed for
Westminster. Given these existing challenges, careful consideration would need
to be given to any change for Westminster, and the consequential impact on
the progress already made, and progress yet to be made in the administration
of elections in the UK.
International experience
A few international examples were selected for examination in this review from
established western democracies with voting systems that provide a degree of
comparability with the new voting systems in the UK. These examples show
that the political culture is central to the number of parties in parliament, the
longevity of governments and political behaviour under different systems. While
PR enables a greater number of parties to be represented and the likelihood
of coalition governments, the longevity of governments and parties differs by
political context.
Internationally, turn-out under proportional systems is on average about
five percentage points higher than for majoritarian systems (principally, but
not exclusively, FPTP). This differential cannot be attributed solely to the voting
system with multiple factors impacting on voter turn-out. Countries in Europe
with relatively high turn-out operate closed list systems, which make the least
connection between individual candidates and constituents, a feature valued
highly in the context of the UK.
New Zealand changed from FPTP to the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)
system as recently as 1996. Important changes experienced have been
the shift to mainly minority administrations supported by other parties in
Parliament, with the role of the parliament in policy-making and scrutiny
being strengthened. There have also been unexpected developments such as
innovative coalition agreements and turn-out rates falling below the rates under
FPTP after an initial small boost at the introduction of MMP.
New Zealand and the Republic of Ireland provide examples of stable coalition
governments. Coalition formations in the Netherlands and Italy have resulted
in greater volatility than in the cases of Sweden and Germany (except for the
close contest for the 2005 election in Germany).
The provinces of British Columbia and Ontario in Canada formed citizen-based
bodies to recommend options for electoral reform that were put to referendum.
In British Columbia, the Citizens' Assembly of 2004 recommended a change
from FPTP to STV, but the majority fell just short of the 60 percent threshold
for the referendum. In Ontario, the Civic Forum of 2006 recommended that
FPTP be replaced by MMP (AMS) but the referendum supported keeping FPTP
with a majority of 63 percent.
Conclusion
This review has discussed the experience of the newly introduced voting
systems in the UK in terms of performance against particular criteria. While this
type of analysis does not provide objective conclusions about different voting
systems, it assists in the debate by clarifying the relative merits of different
systems as experienced in the UK. Voting systems have multiple impacts and
consequences but the interpretation of these as either positive or negative is
largely a matter of political judgement.
We have presented this collation of information and analysis to contribute
to the debate on voting systems, which is, and will always be, a political and
normative debate.
Implications for Westminster
This review was undertaken to consider the experience of the new voting
systems introduced in the UK once they were embedded, to inform the debate
on whether the voting system for Westminster should be changed to some
form of PR.
A move to any form of PR for Westminster would imply a range of significant
changes including:
more small parties represented in Parliament (due to proportionality)
greater tendency for coalition governments
multi-member constituencies.
On these three points and, in the case of greater proportionality, research
and evidence is clear about the outcome of a shift to PR. The benefits of
PR are that it is likely to increase people's choices in elections and provide
a more proportional allocation of seats in Parliament. This in turn increases
the likelihood of coalition governments. There would need to be a shift to
more government by consensus and compromise, particularly in the period
following elections when coalition or other agreements were being negotiated.
This consequential change to the nature of government formation is a key
consideration in the debate about whether PR should be introduced for
Westminster, including the subsequent changes to the nature of policy
development. Any party could become part of the coalition government,
regardless of its size or share of the votes.
The benefit of FPTP is that it generally delivers an undisputed result and winner.
Under FPTP it is possible for the government to be formed by a party that has
a small majority, and potentially a disproportional share of seats. However
the government will generally be formed by the party with the most seats,
and usually, the party with the most votes. Under FPTP, power is vested in
the "largest minority", while under PR, disproportional power can be wielded
by any number of small parties with a minority of votes as part of a coalition
government.
A key question is whether there is public knowledge of, and interest in, voting
systems reform for Westminster. Limited survey data shows that few people
have firm and consistent attitudes about different voting systems, though
peoples' views are open to change when they receive more information.14
While some people do support greater proportionality, the popularity of PR
has not been on the increase. Support for PR decreases in survey results when
questions suggest that PR would result in more small parties in Parliament,
indicating that there is concern and public uncertainty about the influence of
small parties and coalitions on government.
On other desired outcomes, such as improving voter turn-out or social
representation in Parliament, we cannot say that a shift to PR would
guarantee improvements given the range of contributing factors. In terms
of administrative issues, as set out in the 2007 Scottish Elections Review,
a comprehensive research and testing programme would need to be
implemented well before changes are introduced. Careful consideration
would need to be given to the range of potential outcomes and unintended
consequences of changing the voting system, some of which would be very
difficult to attribute or control.
When considering a change to Westminster, two other points are worth noting.
The Single Transferable Vote (STV) has been proposed by some proponents of
PR as an alternative to FPTP in Westminster. STV has not yet been tested in a
nation of similar size to the UK. Currently, countries that use STV for national-
level elections tend to be relatively small in terms of population size. STV is
used in the Republic of Ireland, Malta and Australia (a medium-sized country
but where STV is used for the Senate and local elections in Australian states),
some local councils in New Zealand, and several states in the USA.15 Party List
systems are the most widely used system among Western democracies that
have recently shifted to a form of PR.
Another point of consideration is how any voting system for the House of
Commons would interact with a reformed and substantially or fully elected
House of Lords. It is not within the remit of this review to comment on
House of Lords reform. However, in terms of international examples of two
chamber models, the Republic of Ireland is the only country that uses STV
for election to the main legislative house. Australia uses AV for electing the
House of Representatives and STV for electing the Senate in its bicameral
Commonwealth Parliament. In Italy, the Chamber of Duties and the Senate are
both elected through a form of Party List (PR). In Germany, the main chamber
is elected using AMS or MMP and the members of the second chamber are
appointed by, and usually consist of, members of the Governments of the
Länder. There is a great deal of diversity. Some countries balance mixed and
purer PR systems across both Houses. Further research and analysis would
be needed to consider complementary systems and appropriate models for
Westminster. It is clear that the voting system for the House of Commons
should not be considered in isolation from proposals for a substantially
reformed House of Lords.
Introduction
The Labour Party pledged in its 1997 manifesto to bring forward a programme
of constitutional reform. This has led to devolution in Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, a Mayor and Assembly for London, the first stage of reform of
the House of Lords, the Freedom of Information Act (2000) and modernisation
of the House of Commons. This programme led to the creation of a number of
new democratic institutions. A variety of voting systems are used for elections
to these institutions. They are summarised in Chapter 2.
The Labour Party's 1997 manifesto also made a commitment to a referendum
on the voting system for the House of Commons and the establishment of
an independent commission on voting systems to recommend a proportional
alternative to the FPTP system. The Independent Commission was established
in December 1997 under the chairmanship of Lord Jenkins of Hillhead. When
it reported, in October 1998, its principal recommendation was a two-vote
mixed system, described as an alternative top-up (AV+)18. Under this system,
the majority of MPs would continue to be elected on an individual constituency
basis by AV. Candidates with the most votes would be elected. The top-up
element would ensure reasonable proportionality by taking into account the
distribution of second votes.
The Government was not convinced by the Commission’s recommendations
and decided to review the performance of the systems once they had sufficient
time to bed in. At the 2001 General election the Labour Party’s manifesto
pledged to “review the experience of the new systems and the Jenkins
Commission Report to assess whether changes might be made to the electoral
system for the House of Commons [and whether] a referendum remains the
right way to agree any change for Westminster”19. The Labour Party manifesto
for the 2005 election stated that the Labour Party “remains committed to
reviewing the experience of the new electoral systems – introduced for the
devolved administrations, the European Parliament and the London Assembly”.
It also noted that the Labour Party’s view remained that a referendum was “the
right way to agree any change for Westminster”20.
This paper is the result of this review. It provides a summary of the following:
voting systems used in the UK for the National Assembly for Wales,
the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the European
Parliament, the Greater London Assembly, and the London Mayoral
elections
international experience of voting systems, which mirror those in the UK
the findings of the Independent Commission on the Voting System
(Jenkins Commission), a report commissioned by the Government as a
consequence of a manifesto commitment in 199721
the report of the Independent Commission on Proportional Representation
(ICPR), established at the Constitution Unit at University College of
London, which reported in 2004; and those parts of the Power Inquiry, an
independent inquiry established in 2004 and chaired by Baroness Kennedy
of the Shaws, that considered issues around electoral systems23
the findings of the Richard Commission in Wales
and the Arbuthnott
Commission in Scotland.25
This review includes an assessment of the voting systems and their impacts
against a range of commonly used criteria, discussed in Chapter 6. These are:
the proportionality of outcomes: the relationship between representation
and votes
voter participation
the possible impact of different voting systems on the stability and
effectiveness of government
the impact on the voter in terms of choice, ease and understanding, and
the connection between the voter and the representative
the extent to which those elected represent society
the impact on political parties and candidates
the impact on the administration of elections.
This review brings the available evidence together in summary form and is a
result of desk-based research by officials in the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). In
addition to the sources listed in the terms of reference this review includes
findings from research and evaluations. Since the review is intended to
summarise and bring together existing material, the MoJ has not commissioned
any original research, nor has it undertaken any consultation with external
stakeholders.
Chapter 2: Summary of electoral systems operating in the UK
Westminster Parliamentary elections
First Past the Post (FPTP): Voters fill in a ballot paper by marking an "X" against
a single candidate. Winning candidates must get more votes than any other
candidate in the constituency (a plurality, but not necessarily a majority).
There are 646 constituencies across the UK.
Five years is fixed as the maximum duration for a Parliament but the Prime
Minister normally requests dissolution from the Monarch before Parliament
expires. (The statutory electoral timetable is set out in the Representation of the
People Act 1983.)
European Parliamentary elections
Closed Party List system in England, Scotland and Wales: There are considerable
variations in the different types of list systems but the basic principle behind
them is that the proportion of votes that each party receives determines
the number of seats it can fill. Each party draws up a list of candidates in
each constituency and the size of each list is based on the number of seats
to be filled. Since the basis of the list system is a vote for a party rather than
a candidate, the type of list that is used is the means of determining the
allocation of seats between the party candidates. In the Closed List systems
voters choose their preferred party, rather than candidate. Closed Party List
system operate in 11 regions of Great Britain, including the nations of Scotland
and Wales, electing 75 Members of European Parliament (MEPs).
The Single Transferable Vote system (STV) is used in Northern Ireland
(See description of STV below under Northern Ireland).
The allocation of seats is determined by the d'Hondt formula (see Annex B).
78 seats are allocated to the UK.
Elections are held every five years.
Scottish Parliament elections
Additional Member System (AMS): Electors cast two votes — one for a
constituency representative and one for a party list. The percentage of list votes
obtained by each party determines their overall number of representatives and
is used to top-up the number of constituencies won to the required degree
of proportionality. The constituency or directly elected members are usually
elected by FPTP; the list element is usually closed.
There are 129 seats in total, with 73 Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs)
elected on FPTP basis and 56 additional members elected from party lists
drawn up from each of the European Parliamentary constituencies.
Elections are held every four years.
National Assembly for Wales elections
Additional Member System (AMS): Electors cast two votes — one for a
constituency representative and one for a party list. The percentage of list votes
obtained by each party determines their overall number of representatives and
is used to top-up the number of constituencies won to the required degree
of proportionality. The constituency or directly elected members are usually
elected by FPTP; the list element is usually closed.
There are 60 seats in total, 40 members elected on FPTP basis using the
same boundaries as elections to the House of Commons and 20 additional
members elected from party lists based on the former European Parliament
constituencies. Four members are elected from each of these regions.
Elections are held every four years
Northern Ireland Assembly elections
Single Transferable Vote (STV): Voters fill in a ballot paper by marking their ballot
paper 1,2,3 and so on against their most preferred individual candidates across
any party or combination of parties. Winning candidates must obtain a ‘quota’
of support to qualify for one of the seats in a constituency.
There are 108 seats, with each of the 18 constituencies for the House of
Commons returning six members using STV.
Elections are held every four years. The Assembly was suspended in 2002
and not restored until 8 May 2007. Elections were held during suspension in
November 2003 and March 2007.
London Assembly elections
Additional Member System (AMS): Electors cast two votes – one for a
constituency representative and one for a party list. The percentage of list votes
obtained by each party determines their overall number of representatives and
is used to top-up the number of constituencies won to the required degree
of proportionality. The constituency or directly elected members are usually
elected by FPTP; the list element is usually closed.
There are a total of 25 seats, with 14 members elected on FPTP basis in
electoral areas designed specifically for these elections and 11 additional
members elected from London-wide party lists.
Elections are held every four years
London Mayoral elections
Supplementary Vote system (SV): Voters fill in a ballot paper by marking an "X"
against their first preference candidate and, if they want to, against a second
preference candidate. A winning candidate must either: 1) get majority (50.1
percent or more) support from voters’ first preferences, or 2) obtain majority
support following one or more redistributions of the second preferences of
voters backing the bottom candidates, or 3) be the leading candidate after one
or more such redistributions of second and subsequent preferences of voters
backing the bottom candidates.
Elections are held every four years.
The following systems are not part of the remit of the review of voting systems,
but are listed here for completeness:
Local Government elections in England and Wales
First Past the Post (described above under Westminster): In English county
authorities, most seats (93 percent) are elected using single-member FPTP,
the remainder are two-member with a small number of three-member seats
elected at the same time as the single-member seats. In English shire districts
and unitary districts there are a mixture of single-member, two-member
and three member wards (single or multi-member FPTP). In Metropolitan
authorities three-member FPTP is used in nearly all wards and in London
boroughs in nearly all wards (98 percent). Welsh unitary authorities have a
mixture of single-member or multi-member wards with all councillors elected
at the same time using FPTP.
There are a variety of electoral cycles. In 243 of the 386 authorities in England
(including all county councils and London boroughs) and the 22 authorities
in Wales, elections for all seats are held every four years. The remaining 143
authorities in England elect a proportion of members in different years over
a four-year period (elections by thirds (136 authorities) where a third of
councillors are elected in three out of four years; or elections by halves (seven
authorities) where one half of councillors are elected every other year).
Local Government elections in Scotland: Single Transferable Vote (STV), previously FPTP: described above under
Local Government elections in Northern Ireland:
Single Transferable Vote in multi-member local authorities.
Local Mayoral elections in England and Wales:
Supplementary vote (SV), as for the London Mayor.
Chapter 3: Arguments for and against different voting systems
This review looks at the impact of different voting systems against a range of
criteria, with a focus on the systems that have been introduced for the devolved
jurisdictions (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), the European Parliament,
the London Assembly and London Mayor. To start with, however, we provide
a summary of the arguments commonly used to support the existing FPTP
system used for UK General elections and those used to argue in favour of a
change to a more proportional system.
The main advantages of the FPTP system are said to be:
it is a well-established system in the UK. It is easy to understand and
everyone knows how it works
ballot papers are easy to complete – a cross by a single candidate.
Counting, equally, is relatively easy – the candidate with the most
votes wins the constituency election and represents the people of that
constituency at Westminster
Members of Parliament represent constituents within a defined
geographical area, which makes it possible to identify constituents and
their representatives and to build links between them. It is possible for an
MP to be reasonably independent of his or her party, if he or she retains
the support of the local party
the winner-takes-all aspect of the system encourages the major parties to
maintain a broad appeal, thus discouraging extremism. It is also difficult
for extremist parties to establish a strong enough base to win seats at
Westminster
the system allows the electorate to be decisive about who should be the
party of government. Unpopular parties can be removed completely from
power
more often than not, governments have a working majority in Parliament,
so that decisive government is possible. This enables the formation
of a clear opposition in Parliament who can present themselves as an
alternative to, and check on, the government of the day.
The main disadvantages of FPTP are said to be:
it is capable of delivering highly disproportional outcomes at the national
level. Governments can be elected without a majority of the popular vote
and can even win a majority of seats without winning more votes than any
other party.
many constituencies are "safe" seats for particular parties, with little
prospect of changes. Therefore people who do not support the majority
party have no prospect of making their vote "count". Similarly, even voters
supporting the winning candidate may feel that their votes serve only to
increase an already large majority
campaigning, particularly by the national parties, is strongly focused
on a few marginal constituencies (and even specific areas within these
constituencies). This trend is accentuated as campaigning technology
becomes ever more sophisticated
movements of opinion can be heavily exaggerated, with large swings
in seats from one major party to another. Landslide majorities may not
reflect public opinion
governing parties equipped with large majorities may not pay sufficient
heed to opinion in Parliament or amongst the general public
small parties tend to be excluded from parliament unless they have a
strong base in a particular region. Those with an even spread of support
across the country are particularly penalised. This reduces the diversity of
views expressed in Parliament, and alienates voters who do not wish to
vote for the major parties
in areas where most constituents do not vote for their elected MP, it can
be difficult for them to feel properly represented.
Proportional systems in general
There are many varieties of proportional voting systems but there are three
broad types used in the UK:
those where the vote is for a party list, either at national or regional level
the Additional Member System, which combines the First Past the Post
system at constituency level and a party list at regional or national level
the Single Transferable Vote in multi-member constituencies.
Some of the advantages of proportional systems are said to be:
that the outcomes are proportional at a national level, appealing to
people’s sense of fairness and ensuring that everyone’s vote counts in
some way.
voters have more choice as more parties have the chance of being elected.
Minority interests can be represented in Parliament
voter turn-out tends to be around five percentage points higher in
countries with a form of PR, including List PR
government tends to be by coalition (or through a minority government
supported in Parliament by an agreement with other parties). This means
that a wider range of interests are represented in government and that
parliaments tend to have a stronger hold over the executive
it is possible to maintain constituency links under the AMS or STV.
The arguments against proportional systems are said to be:
the prevalence of party list systems, in whole or in part (as in the Additional
Member System), makes the candidate and representative remote from
the voter, compared with single member constituencies
where party lists are combined with constituency members in the UK
experience, there is a tendency for conflict between the two types of
representative
the tendency towards coalition or minority governments can have a
number of negative effects. It can take a long time to form a government;
governments may be indecisive on policy agendas; small parties can have
significant power in coalition formations; and parties which have become
unpopular with the electorate may be able to retain a stake in power
voters may not really know what policies they are voting for, as successful
parties are those that are able to negotiate the best deals in coalitions as
they are being formed
there may be stagnation over time, with the same parties regularly forming
governments. This may lead to more extreme parties forming in order to
express grievances.
[CommentOnThis.com note: we now skip to chapter 6]
Chapter 6: Assessing the experience
In this chapter, we assess the experience of the new voting systems in the
devolved jurisdictions as well as General elections in the UK since 1997,
against the themes (or criteria) outlined in the introduction. The purpose is to
present findings of the experience of the various voting systems in the UK to
contribute to the debate on whether changes should be made to the voting
system for the House of Commons. As it is a desktop review we do not make
any recommendations but set out findings to inform the debate.
This review, as with many others that try to independently compare voting
systems, has looked to compare voting systems using criteria describing
potentially desirable properties. These are broadly similar to those used by the
Jenkins Commission81 and the ICPR.82 However, we have added a section on
the impact of different electoral systems on the administration of the elections.
This is an important factor to consider as we rely on returning officers and
electoral administrators to deliver elections and they face increasing challenges.
This section also sets out the findings of the SER, although this does not
include the Governments official response to the SER conclusions, which will
be made in due course.
A. Proportionality
During the 1950s the French political scientist Maurice Duverger theorised that
a FPTP system naturally resulted in the dominance of two political parties and
added that FPTP systems would act to delay the emergence of a new political
force.83 This became generally accepted, although there are international
examples, such as Canada and India, where FPTP has co-existed with multi-
party representation.
The experience of the UK in the 1950s and 1960s to a large extent has borne
out Duverger's thesis and representation in the House of Commons reflected
votes cast with a reasonable degree of proportionality. However, with the
growing strength of the Liberals (now, after a period as the Alliance (with the
Social Democrats), the Liberal Democrats) and nationally-based parties like
Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party, the effects of the "winner takes all"
system has become less predictable. This has also led to a greater distortion of
the share of seats in proportion to votes. Figure 1 below shows how the seats-
to-votes ratio of the governing party has developed since 1945. A ratio of one
indicates no bias towards the winning party.
Whilst recent General elections under FPTP have produced less proportional
results, this has not always been the case. The graph above shows that
outcomes were more proportional in the 1950s when the two main parties
received the vast majority of votes cast.
The consensus view among academics and political commentators is that
the operation of the FPTP system not only favours the winning party, but
that other factors have combined with this since 1997 to currently favour the
Labour Party. Among the main factors are:
regional distribution of party strength Labours geographic concentration
gives it an electoral advantage
differences in size of the electorate in constituencies Labour wins more
constituencies with relatively small electorates
differences in turn-out in constituencies Labour wins a higher proportion
of constituencies with relatively low turn-out
the tendency of tactical voting, thus far, to involve exchanges of votes
between Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters against Conservative
candidates.
The ERS (2007) argue that, in 2005, even a small Conservative lead in the
nation-wide vote would have resulted in a Labour majority in the Commons.
To win, the Conservatives would have needed to win by more than 11.7
percent of the votes to have a majority of seats.
Some of these factors may alter over time but, for now, they have combined
to deliver the highest seats-to-votes ratio since 1945, as illustrated above. This
has led to increasing comment on the disproportional nature of UK General
election results. The ERS in its report, The UK General election of 5 May 2005:
Report and Analysis,86 observed that Labour won an overall majority of 66 seats,
or 55.1 percent of seats, with 35.2 percent of the vote, which was the lowest
percentage of votes won by a majority government since the extension of the
franchise in 1918. No majority government since 1970, Labour or Conservative,
has won the election with more than 45 percent of the votes cast. The highest
percentages were the Conservatives with 43.9 percent in 1979 and Labour with
43.2 percent in 1997 and these were both elections when the Government was
replaced.
The ERS argue that since 1974 the growing strength of third and other small
parties, in particular the Liberal Democrats, has increased the chance of a hung
parliament (where no party or coalition of parties can control a majority of
seats in Parliament). They show that this has happened because the number of
votes for the small parties has increased and the number of marginal seats has
fallen, meaning that greater swings in the vote are required for seats to change
hands than was previously the case. The ERS argue that the Liberal Democrats
are unlikely to lose many seats in the forthcoming elections even if their
national vote was to decline somewhat, meaning that the two big parties are
unlikely to reach 40 percent of the vote. Therefore, they consider that FPTP will
continue to deliver winning parties with significantly less than 50 percent of
the vote, raising concerns about the legitimacy of those governments. However,
another key contributing factor which increases disproportional outcomes is
declining voter turn-out, about which the causes are not straightforward. Voter
turn-out is discussed in more detail in Section B.
Other research on disproportionality of UK General elections provides a
different perspective and emphasis. Johnston, Rossiter & Pattie (Johnston et
al)87 argue that the FPTP system is not in and of itself biased to the Labour
Party. Instead the current bias is a function of primarily small constituency
sizes, the increasing popularity of the Liberal Democrats in particular seats that
would otherwise be won by the Conservatives and that Labours vote share
has become more efficiently distributed. They argue that the electoral system
is not the cause of disproportional outcomes and that the disproportionality
is not unique to the most recent General elections. Also, the fact that the
circumstances now favour Labour and the size of the disproportionality is
greater, is a new development. They argue that this could be reduced slightly if
the Boundaries Commission reviews were both increased and sped-up but that
"bias caused by the constituency-size variations between and within countries is
only one component of the total, although it may be crucial in close contests"
.88
Johnston et al also point to improving voter turn-out as a potential solution
as they conclude that it is how voters and parties act that contributes to the
generation of the disproportionality and bias towards Labour under the current
FPTP system. In their own words: except for variations in constituency
size, the workings of the FPTP system cannot be blamed for delivering two
landslide victories to Labour with less than 45 percent of the votes in 1997 and
2001 and a third in 2005 when a 25 percentage points lead in seats over its main
opponent emerged despite only a three-point lead in vote share. Geography is
key to those biases, but not the geography of constituency definition. Rather
it is a combination of the geographies of party support, turn-out and party
campaigning within that geography which produces most of the bias, currently
favouring Labour because of where its supporters live, where they turn-out and
where it campaigns for their support.89
Johnston et al conclude that the causes of proportionality in election outcomes
require sophisticated evaluation given the complex contributory factors. Simple
attributions of the cause of disproportionality to the voting system do not
reflect the circumstances that took place in recent UK General elections.
The experience of the devolved governments in the UK
To look at proportionality in the devolved jurisdiction elections relative
to the General elections, one approach is to calculate the deviation from
proportionality of the results (how far away the parties are from winning
the same proportion of seats as their votes). That is, to measure how many
representatives hold seats that are not justified by their partys share of the
vote, either nationally or regionally. The conventional measure of deviation
from proportionality is known as DV, and political scientists regard a DV score
of 4-8 percentage points as indicating proportionality90.
The following graph shows the DV scores for the UK General elections, Welsh,
Scottish, Northern Ireland, European Parliamentary and London Assembly
elections since 1997.
The scores in Figure 2 suggest that STV was most proportional, with DV
scores from 6.0 to 6.6 for Northern Ireland between 1999 and 2007, although
under STV the DV score very much depends on the number of members in
the multi-member constituencies. Similarly, the proportionality of AMS tends
to depend on the ratio of list to constituency members, with Wales having a
higher number of constituency members to list members (2/1) compared to
Scotlands 1.3/1.
In Scotland and Wales, the DV scores have increased since 1999, while the
opposite occurred in the London Assembly elections. In Scotland there were
smaller increases between 1999 and 2007. In Wales, the DV Score is much
larger in 2007 than the previous two assembly elections, which appears to be
in part because some of the small parties (in particular the UKIP and BNP),
increased their share of the regional list vote but failed to win any seats overall.
The data also suggests that the performance of AMS in devolved jurisdiction
elections has been similar to the experience of the closed list system used in
the European Parliamentary elections.
Overall, the DV scores show that AMS generally produces a result less
disproportional than FPTP, and Northern Irelands experience with STV is the
most proportional.
Farrell (2001) finds that while generally majoritarian systems tend to produce
more disproportionatal elections results than PR systems, this is not surprising.
However, he also points out that this is not a hard and fast rule, showing that
there are many different factors in elections that affect the proportionality
of the results, not just the voting system. For example, in the UK General
elections, results have become less proportional with the increase in support
for the small parties. The DV Score for the 2005 election was 20.6 but in 1951,
when the Labour and Conservatives between them gained over 90 percent
of the vote, the result was highly proportional with a DV score of 4.1, lower
even than the Northern Ireland Assembly under STV. Other influences on
proportionality include the magnitude of electoral districts and the number of
seats in the assembly. Farrell shows that while majoritarian systems are less
proportional in general, there are also many factors affecting proportionality
other than just the voting system. He also points to the findings of Richard S
Katz who contends that different types of PR systems in and of themselves
do not tend to produce greater or lesser degrees of proportionality. Instead,
the size of the electoral districts is a more important determinant of
proportionality.92 Farrells 2001 analysis, which tests Katz conclusion shows
that if ranked by district magnitude, disproportionality under different systems
decreases as district magnitude increases.93 Therefore on balance, discussions
about proportionality should take into account the complex causes of
disproportionality.
Conclusion
All the new systems have achieved a higher degree of proportionality in
outcome than FPTP, although only STV in Northern Ireland has achieved what
academic observers consider to be close to genuine proportionality. While the
FPTP system for Westminster currently favours the Labour Party, it is capable of
large swings in seats won by the two major parties and this is less predictable
with the advent of a relatively strong third party, the Liberal Democrats.
We can conclude that proportional systems tend to be just that, more
proportional. However, factors other than the voting system impact on
proportionality, in particular district magnitude and voter behaviour. While
there is a consensus about the factors contributing to proportionality and
disproportionality, there are different views on interventions. The questions
that arise therefore are whether the debate about proportionality concerns
the unfairness of the current system towards the emerging third party and if
this is a justification for change, or whether changes in other factors such as
turn-out and constituency size can reduce disproportionality. Debates about
proportionality need to acknowledge the range of factors involved and require
sophisticated evaluation.
B Voter participation
Voter participation is often seen as a measure of confidence in democracy
and the voting system in use.94 However, the drivers of voter participation and
non-participation are complex. As we will see in Chapter 7 on the international
perspective, research carried out by Pippa Norris in 2003 suggests that, on
average, turn-out in countries with some form of PR tends to be about five
percentage points higher than in those with majoritarian systems around 65
percent compared with 60 percent. This differential is sometimes presented
as being as high as 10 percentage points, but Chapter 7 explains why this may
be an exaggeration. Also, voter turn-out is higher in countries where voting is
compulsory. This section explores the factors impacting on voter turn-out in
the UK since 1997.
Turn-out for General elections is usually higher than for elections in the
devolved jurisdictions, European Parliament and London elections and
compared to local elections where turn-out tends to be in the 30-40 percent
range. However, General election turn-out fell sharply in 2001 compared with
1997, before stabilising in 2005 without much improvement. Turn-out since
the introduction of new voting systems initially fell in the Scottish, Welsh and
Northern Irish Assembly elections but improved slightly in the most recent
elections in Scotland and Wales. The 2004 European Parliamentary and London
elections bucked the declining trend in turn-out, but levels are still much lower
than for General elections.
Of the devolved jurisdictions, Northern Ireland has had the highest turn-out,
although turn-out has dropped since 1998. The 2007 turn-out in the Northern
Ireland elections did not improve from 2003, at 63 percent, though this was
similar to the overall level of turn-out at the last General election. Some
commentators considered that the recent Northern Ireland election turn-out
was higher than expected given the uncertainty of whether a functioning
Northern Ireland Executive would be established after the election. Generally,
higher voter turn-out in Northern Ireland is likely to be influenced by a number
of factors, such as its unique political context, the perceived impact the
Assembly has on peoples lives, the level of grass-root party activity and the
rarity of safe seats under STV.96 In Wales, turn-out increased by 5 percentage
points compared to 2003, with improvements in all but one constituency and
amongst younger voters and those over 55 years. In Scotland there was just
over a two percentage point improvement in turn-out. European and London
elections have experienced the lowest turn-out although on a upward trend.
The experience in the devolved jurisdictions does not provide a clear pattern on
turn-out. However, the causes of the drop in the General election turn-out to
below 70 percent in 2001 and the small recovery in 2005 has been the subject
of much speculation and analysis by researchers.
Turn-out is the product of a complex set of factors. Various factors that could
be considered to impact on participation in elections are voter knowledge, the
reward from voting, the cost of voting, ease or difficulty of registering to vote,
the impact of efforts to increase registration, political campaigning and the
impact of the news media. Other factors include perceptions about the status
of different elections and that some may perceive the General election as first
order and other elections second, or even third. This may be caused by the lack
of awareness about the different powers of assemblies and parliaments and
how they affect peoples lives. Others include the range of political choices,
closeness of the contest, whether people feel their vote counts, whether
people feel politicians speak for them, whether they are aware of the election
and if there are convenient methods of voting. For example, on convenience,
we know that postal voting has been associated with a doubling of turn-out
at local, European Parliamentary and Welsh Assembly elections. We have not
covered research into all the potential opportunities but provide the findings of
some research that is pertinent to the concerns about the drop in participation
in General elections.
Different researchers have taken different approaches to studying the causes
of voter turn-out or lack of it. We present below findings from two approaches.
It is important to note that research into the causes of turn-out are heavily
based on surveys, therefore the limitations of generalising the findings of
different studies, and comparing different systems should be noted from the
original sources.
One approach to the study of voter turn-out is to examine the
motivations
of voters. For various reasons, voters may be more or less interested or
inclined to accept the efficacy of voting. A different approach is to look at the
circumstances facing voters and choices put before them, such as the policies
of political parties and messages from the media.
The Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement (APE) undertaken from
December 2003 onwards provides some insights into the motivations and
characteristics of voters.97 The 2007 survey finds that political and electoral
activism remains a minority activity, with 60 percent of people not having
discussed politics or political issues in two or three years. While most people
agree that they want to have a say in how the country is run, there is a gap
between what they say they are willing to do and what they have actually
done.98 Respondents cited apathy or lack of interest in politics as reasons they
are not more involved in politics.
In terms of propensity to vote, in November 2006, of those surveyed in the
APE, 55 percent said they would be absolutely certain to vote in an immediate
General election, whereas 11 percent would be absolutely certain not to vote.
This was higher than responses in 2003 at 51 percent, and in 2005 it was 52
percent though 61 percent actually turned-out in the General election. As
expected, the Audit finds that the propensity to vote increases by age and
belief in a duty to vote. For example, 92 percent of those certain to vote also
agreed that it is their duty to vote. However, while people who have no formal
qualifications claim to be significantly less interested in and knowledgeable
about politics, they have the same propensity to vote as those with A-levels
or above (58 percent and 57 percent respectively). Another aspect is the
propensity to vote by deprivation, where the audit finds that the very affluent
and those living in rural areas have the highest propensity to vote but the
propensity to vote is the same for those in deprived areas and those in
middle to affluent areas. The very deprived have the lowest propensity to
vote. Overall the APE finds that across 16 indicators, there is no evidence of a
decline in political engagement but that engagement levels are holding steady,
although this analysis is limited in that the survey only began in 2003 after the
decline of voter participation in 2001.
Other studies about voter motivations and characteristics also find that
the decline in turn-out has resulted in turn-out inequality, where turn-out
decreased most rapidly amongst young people and those within lower income
groups.99 The Electoral Commission suggests that six key reasons for not voting
are apathy (a lack of interest in politics), disillusionment with politics, lack
of impact (idea that individuals cant make a difference), alienation, lack of
knowledge about politics and inconvenience.100 However, in the case of 2001
and 2005, the Electoral Commission did not find that inconvenience, apathy or
declining interest in politics or political activity contributed to falling turn-out
but rather a perceived lack of efficacy.
The Curtice, Fisher and Lessard-Phillips study (Curtice
6.33 et al)101 examine the
circumstances before voters and the impact on voter turn-out in the 2001
and 2005 General elections. They found, based on the British Elections Study,
that 59 percent of people who had no interest in politics voted in 1997 but
the turn-out level of this category of people dropped to 31 percent in 2001
and remained at 31 percent in 2005. These elections failed to attract people
who were already less motivated to vote.102 By comparison, 87 percent of
people who had a great deal of interest in politics voted in 1997, but the
proportion of such people who voted in 2001 and 2005 dropped only slightly,
to approximately 81 percent each time. Curtice et al also show that the
proportion of people in the latter group, i.e. with a great deal or quite a lot
of interest in politics has remained very steady over the past twenty years, at
about 30 percent. Therefore, the electorate does not appear to have become
more disengaged from politics in 2001 and 2005 than in 1997 but turn-out
fell amongst those who were already disengaged from the political process, the
voters least likely to vote and those most in need of persuading. This supports
the APE findings about the increasing inequalities in voter turn-out discussed
above.
At the same time, the proportions of people who had little or no interest in
politics who also said there was not much difference between the parties
increased, from 31 percent in 1997, to 58 percent in 2001, to 55 percent
in 2005.103 Curtice et al states that the perception that there is not much
difference between the parties grew most rapidly between 1997 and 2001
amongst the least interested in politics.
Another criticism of FPTP is that it is said to encourage parties to cluster
in the centre ground of politics, which results in the two main parties
promulgating similar policies. This is said to discourage voters because they
cannot differentiate between the two main parties. For example, the Electoral
Commissions surveys of voters and non-voters following the Scottish 2003
elections found that many people felt that there was little difference between
the parties 37 percent of non-voters in Scotland cited this as a reason for not
voting. Curtice et al when comparing different countries and voting systems
finds that in countries with FPTP, voters appear to be less likely to regard
political parties as very different from each other and this is particularly the
case for less knowledgeable voters.104
It has been argued that all other things being equal, under FPTP fewer people
are likely to vote relative to PR systems for a variety of different reasons.105
One is that in constituencies where one party consistently wins, voters of
other parties are less likely to think that their vote will make a difference (voter
efficacy). Under a PR system, large overall majorities are unlikely and voters
may have a greater chance to influence the outcome because their party can
still achieve a seat even if they do not come first. With regard to voter efficacy,
Curtice et al do find a difference between FPTP and other systems. Under
other voting systems 38 percent strongly agreed that who people vote for can
make a difference to what happens but only 28 percent agreed that their vote
could make a difference under FPTP. However, amongst the less knowledgeable
voters,106 there is no difference in feelings of efficacy between FPTP countries
and those with other voting systems. While we can generally expect voters
with low knowledge to feel less efficacious, this is no less so in countries
using FPTP than countries using other voting systems. So while studies on
voter motivation and circumstances show a decline in turn-out amongst less
interested voters and those who perceive little difference between parties, a
group also likely to also have low levels of knowledge of politics, there is no
difference amongst this group in terms of voter efficacy between FPTP and PR.
This illustrates the complexity of determining the causes of voter turn-out.
Turn-out can be influenced by both the motivations of individual voters as well
as the specific external circumstances of elections. Curtice et al have argued
that if an election appears to be a foregone conclusion or if there appears to
be few differences between the parties, those with less interest in politics are
less likely to turn-out. They also say that it appears that circumstances created
by FPTP may discourage those with little knowledge or interest in politics from
voting, but precisely why this is the case is not wholly clear particularly since
perceived voter efficacy amongst low-knowledge voters is not found to differ
between countries with FPTP and other voting systems. Whilst it is reasonable
to argue that lack of party differentiation has an impact, there is insufficient
evidence about voter efficacy or campaigning behaviour having an impact on
low-knowledge voters.
Additionally, the findings about low-knowledge voters by Curtice
et al do
not seem consistent with the findings from the APE about voters who are
less interested and knowledgeable about politics and who have no formal
qualifications, who under the APE survey appear to have the same propensity
to vote as those with A-level qualifications. Regardless of the causes, the issue
of lower turn-out amongst voters with less knowledge is a concern in terms of
the inequality in turn-out between the more and less knowledgeable voters. It
will be important to study further and monitor the relationship between low
knowledge and interest in politics, if these two factors are related and whether
the population of non-voters will increase in the future.
It is clear that on the impact of different voting systems, voter participation is
difficult to establish. However, the findings from both voter-motivation studies
and voter-circumstances studies show a decline in turn-out amongst voters
with little knowledge and interest in politics in the General elections of 2001
and 2005, and this is a concern. John Curtice suggest that, since perceptions
of a close contest seem to be an important factor in determining turn-out, as
British politics becomes more competitive, the decline in voter turn-out could
be reversed.
Conclusion
Voter turn-out in the elections in Scotland and Wales under AMS was
initially relatively low in 1999, declined in 2003, but improved slightly in
the most recent elections in 2007. London and the European elections saw
improvements in turn-out under the SV, AMS and the Party List systems in
their 2004 elections, although turn-out was still low in comparison to other
elections. Northern Ireland under STV has seen a slight decrease in turn-out
ince 1998. The General FPTP elections saw a sharp decline in turn-out in 2001
compared to 1997 with only a slight improvement in 2005. Turn-out dropped
most in 2001 and 2005 amongst voters with no interest in politics and who
perceive little difference between parties. The situation is made more complex
by other studies that show various aspects such as deprivation and age as
contributing factors to the propensity to vote. There is a suggestion that the
trends of voter turn-out in the General elections suggest rising inequalities
in turn-out, but perceived voter efficacy amongst those with low levels of
knowledge does not vary between FPTP and other systems. Whilst this section
has touched on just a few studies on voter turn-out, it is clear that the causes
of turn-out are multiple and complex and it is difficult to assess the impact of
the voting systems on turn-out in isolation.
C Stability and effectiveness of governments
Assessing the stability and effectiveness of governments is contentious and
difficult. The debate has tended to focus on whether coalition governments can
be as stable and effective as majority governments.
Stability
Supporters of the FPTP system often point to the fact that it has been
associated with stable government in the UK and tends to produce a clear
winner in a General election. It has produced a number of sustained periods
of unbroken government by one party, particularly in the second half of the
twentieth century: Conservative 1951-64 and 1979-97 and Labour since 1997.
It has more often than not produced an unequivocal result, with the governing
party being returned to Parliament with a comfortable working majority.
Only on two occasions in the past 60 years has a General election resulted in
the party with the lower share of the vote forming the government. In 1951
the Conservative Party polled fewer votes than the Labour Party but won more
seats and governed with the support of the National Liberals. In February 1974
the Labour Party polled fewer votes than the Conservative Party, but won more
seats and formed a minority administration until a further election in October
of that year.
On three occasions in the past 60 years an election has resulted in a party
governing with a majority of fewer than ten seats. Only in one instance
(Labour, October 1974-79) has the party managed to govern for a full term,
although it did so with an agreement with the Liberal Democrats (Lib-Lab pact)
for the latter part of its term from 1977.
Table 17 shows that no party has governed with the support of more than 50
percent of the popular vote since the Second World War.
Jenkins' perspective when looking at government stability over a longer period
was that:
In only 64 of the past 150 years has there prevailed the alleged principal
benefit of the first-past-the-post system, the production of a single party
government with an undisputed command over the House of Commons.
Opponents of a move from the FPTP system for General elections point to the
stability of governments since 1945 and contrast this with the prevalence of
coalition government in Continental Europe under various PR systems. Italy is
often used as the example of frequent changes of government, while Germany
is used as an example of where a small party (the Free Democrats) have
wielded disproportionate influence by choosing which other party it should
join to form a coalition government. Nonetheless, Germany has had stable
government, with the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition in power for 16 years between
1982 and 1998, and the SPD and Greens for seven years thereafter. Whilst it
took time to form a government following the 2005 elections this was because
the two major parties received very similar shares of the vote and a number of
possible coalitions were considered before the Grand Coalition, including the
two main parties, was formed. Italy, despite frequent changes to government
before it switched to AMS in 1994, was ruled mainly by Christian Democrat-
led coalitions and by the Socialists for a period in the 1980s. So there can be
continuity through coalition government. More detail on the experiences of
Germany and Italy can be found in Chapter 7.
Coalition government in many European countries is expected and the norm.
The pure PR system of the Netherlands, for example, is designed to prevent
single parties or leaders becoming too dominant. However, new parties can
emerge and gain a share of power, as the party of Pim Fortuyn did briefly
in 2002 resulting in another election in 2003. With up to ten parties being
represented in the Netherlands, the chance of instability may be greater.
Overall, coalition government has been stable for the most part in the
Netherlands since the early 1970s, with elections every 3-4 years but the year
following the 2002 election saw a coalition break-down, resulting in an early
election in 2006. In Sweden, coalition governments have usually featured the
Social Democrats, with the proportional list system allowing the support from
six other parties to ebb and flow as political circumstances change. Whilst
the General election held in Sweden on 17 September 2006 saw the ruling
Social Democrats and their left-wing allies narrowly defeated by the centre-
right alliance, the defeated Prime Minister had previously held that position
for 10 years. In the Republic of Ireland, there have been coalition or minority
governments since 1989, during which time the Irish economy has undergone
a highly successful economic transformation. A more detailed analysis of the
experience of these three countries can be found in Chapter 7.
Effectiveness
Several academics have gone some way to investigating the link between
electoral systems and the style or effectiveness of the resulting government.
Arend Lijphart, in his testimony before the California State Legislature in 1995,
gave an overview of his study into the effectiveness of policy-making under
PR and plurality voting systems. He conducted a comparative study of 13
democracies with parliamentary systems over a roughly 30 year time span,
between 1960 to the late 1980s, and analysed the relative success of the
different countries with regard to:
maintaining public order and peace
management of the economy
stimulating economic growth
combating inflation and unemployment.
Liphart declared that he had "found no significant differences except on
unemployment and, in this one respect, it is the PR countries that actually have
the better records. The important conclusion that we can draw is that there is
no trade-off between democratic quality and effectiveness."109
Further studies by Lijphart in 1999 found that non-PR systems helped promote
government duration (one potential indicator of stability) but the study also
showed that it was possible for PR systems also to deliver the same result
(Farrell 2001 p195-196). Farrell (2001) finds that the argument that PR
produces instability is tenuous and that PR has had largely positive effects on
democracy according to a range of measures.
The experience of the devolved jurisdictions in the UK
In Scotland the 1999 and 2003 elections saw Labour and Scottish Liberal
Democrat coalitions. The 2007 election marked a change for Scotland, with
the SNP forming a minority government with the support of two Green
MSPs. Although there were occasional strains on the Labour-Liberal Democrat
coalitions, the only instability at this time was due to other reasons such as
the death of the first First Minister and the resignation of the second First
Minister.110 Following the 2007 elections, with a very close contest between
Labour and SNP, it was not initially clear who could form a government,
although this was resolved in a matter of weeks.
In Wales, there has been more change. After the 1999 elections, Labour
initially formed a minority administration. After the First Secretary lost a vote
of no confidence in February 2000, a coalition was eventually formed with
the Liberal Democrats, in October 2000. The coalition agreement made the
subsequent Labour-Liberal Democrat government more stable and it lasted
until the election in 2003. A small over-all majority in 2003 enabled Labour
to form a single party government until 2005 (when Peter Law resigned) and
Labour continued in minority government until 2007. Labour did not achieve
an absolute majority in the 2007 elections but after a month of negotiations,
struck a deal with Plaid Cymru. Initially Labour was unable to form a coalition
with the Liberal Democrats and an alternative coalition option of the
Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Plaid Cymru failed to come to fruition.
It is beyond the scope of this review to comment on the specific policies that
have been implemented by the elected governments of devolved jurisdictions,
but the Independent Commission on Proportional Representation (ICPR 2003)
reaches the following conclusions about the effect of electoral system change:
"The presence of the Liberal Democrats led to rather more policy
innovation than would have happened under Labour governing alone.
And the evidence suggests that coalition can produce just as effective and
efficient policy-making and implementation as single party government."
"PR has also led to a different relationship between government and
parliament. Coalition governments have to negotiate more to win consent
for their policies: with narrow majorities they cannot take the support of
the assembly for granted. The Scottish Parliament has developed subject
committees, which expose the Executive to more powerful scrutiny than
their counterparts at Westminster. The weekly business is planned with all
the parties, not just the major parties."
"These details of the political process may go unnoticed by the general
public. But public attitude surveys in Scotland and Wales in 1999 and
2003 show little evidence of adverse reaction, and if anything the reverse:
in Scotland and in Wales, people have warmed slightly to coalition
government in the light of experience. They would prefer the parties to
indicate their preferred coalition partners in advance; but they do not
believe that the new voting system gives too much power to small parties,
and they do not believe it leads to unstable government."
In Northern Ireland, PR, and specifically STV, has been essential for delivering an
accommodative regime for both Nationalist and Unionists, as it guarantees the
representation of significant minorities and fosters power-sharing coalitions.
Proportionality is essential for ensuring no significant groups are neglected
by the electoral system and 84 percent people surveyed after the 2003
Northern Ireland elections supported power-sharing between communities.111
However there have been a number of difficulties in how the voting system
has operated within the context of the peace process and, because STV closely
reflects voter behaviour, it has returned polarised parties, making government
formations inherently difficult. Compared to 2003 the 2007 election saw the
largest proportion of votes shift from the two largely centre-based parties to
concentrate between the two more polarised parties (DUP and Sinn Fein, with
the DUP having an eight-seat majority).
However, it is not the existence of STV in Northern Ireland that gives rise to
a coalition government there. Rather, it was a fundamental principle of the
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement that there should be inclusive power-sharing
within the Executive. Therefore, by law, Ministerial portfolios are allocated
using the d'Hondt formula, which allocates seats on the Executive according to
party strength within the Assembly. In addition, the largest party in each of the
unionist and nationalist designations are able to nominate the First and Deputy
First Ministers.
The experience in the UK has not shown a pattern of instability or ineffective
government to date under the new voting systems. AMS had produced a mix
of minority and coalition governments that were relatively stable, though
with initial period of uncertainty, but have required greater policy-making by
negotiation.
Therefore it is difficult to draw conclusions and ones views will be dependent
on the interpretation of stable and effective, most likely influenced by ones perspective on coalitions.
Views on coalitions
The advantage of government formed by coalitions is that a greater number
of voters are represented by the government and policies are determined
by consensus between governing coalition parties. As set out above, there
is no clear evidence that suggests coalitions are unstable, and in some cases
coalition governments are very stable because they achieve broad consensus.
They can better represent changing voter preferences and a multi-cultural and
plural society, particularly as they give voters the greater range of choices over
candidates and parties.
Under PR multi-party governments can be formed either through coalitions,
which requires power sharing, or other arrangements, such as individual
agreements for supply and confidence. The General elections of New
Zealand in 2005 under AMS (called Mixed Member Proportional) provides
an interesting example. The New Zealand Labour party only obtained two
more seats than the second largest party, the National party. Labour formed a
minority government in coalition with its historical ally the Progressive Party
(with one member), and with a confidence-and-supply agreement with the
New Zealand First party (that had seven seats) and the United Future party
(three seats). This arrangement including awarding both these party leaders
ministerial positions outside of the Cabinet, including the post of Minister
for Foreign Affairs. Labour did not give the Green Party any Cabinet positions
despite the Greens support of Labour prior to the elections, although several
concessions on energy and transport policies were made. While historically
relationships between these parties existed, this outcome was innovative and
unexpected, particularly by Green voters as the Green Party was considered
the natural coalition partner for Labour. Despite being complex and sometimes
unpredictable, this has not resulted in any instability to date.
The disadvantage of government formation by coalition is that the patterns
of coalition formation can be considered undemocratic. This is because rather
than elections determining the result (as PR is less likely to provide a party
with a surplus to make a majority, and the UK experience has resulted in
two parties getting roughly equally large shares of the votes), governments
are formed based on who can strike the best deal. While voters may be well
aware that coalitions will be formed after the election, the potential coalition
partnerships may not be clear and political parties have little incentive to
make clear deals before an election. There can also be a period of uncertainty
following the election as parties scramble to make coalitions or other
agreements. Since voters have no influence on the deals that get struck, people
may feel their choices have been diluted.
In theory, FPTP is said to encourage political parties to be broad churches,
reflecting many different societal groups, and exclude extremist parties
from representation in the legislature. The major political parties have been
criticised for moving to the middle to improve their chances of being
elected, contributing to disengagement by some voters. Despite the lack of
differentiation perceived by some, this has enabled parties to field a diverse
array of candidates for election e.g. the Labour Party fielding high levels of
female candidates. Extremist minority parties are unlikely to win seats under
FPTP unless they have strong geographically concentrated support. By contrast,
under List PR system with a single national-level district and a large number
of seats, representation can be achieved through as little as 1 percent of the
vote,112 and in some circumstances, such small parties can hold the balance of
power in coalition formations.
FPTP generally has given rise to single-party governments as it awards seat
bonuses for the largest party. Coalitions are the exception rather than the rule
and this allows cabinets with few restraints in terms of having to bargain with
a minority coalition partner.113 It also allows the ruling party to implement
its policy agenda without too many compromises as required in coalitions.
A benefit of a strong single-party government is that the opposition is also
given enough seats to perform a critical checking role and present themselves
as realistic alternative to the government, and gives rise to a coherent
opposition in the legislature. This may be considered a more beneficial political
environment to one under coalitions because agreements cannot be made
behind closed doors and in ways unintended by voters. This maybe considered
as an advantage for Westminster because of this governing bodys power
and influence across the UK. The influence of very small parties could have
a disproportionate influence on the formation of government and policy
development.
Often Duvergers claim that FPTP tends to produce a two-party system is
assumed to be a rule.114 However, consideration has been given to how FPTP
will continue to perform in an environment of the major parties. ERS analysis
shows that the tendency to produce overall majorities under FPTP is largely a
contingent rather than a necessary feature of the system that comes about
largely due to the rise of a strong third party and the decline of marginal seats.
The ERS believes that given the trends from 1979 to 2005, large pluralities
where a party attracts as much as 40 percent of the vote is unlikely to be
a regular occurrence in the future and a stable majority government is not
guaranteed under FPTP in the future. Dead-heat type elections such as those
fought between two major parties with the emergence of a significant third
party and declining marginal seats can result in the need for coalitions or
the risk of a hung parliament. If that is the case, it is not clear that FPTP will
continue to operate as it always has.
Public opinion and perception of government
Research on public opinions and support for continuing FPTP following the
disproportional result of the 2005 General election did not show less support
for the FPTP system. In fact, relatively few people have firm and consistent
attitudes about different electoral systems.115 Results also tend to be highly
sensitive to the wording of questions put to respondents. The British Election
Study that surveyed attitudes towards PR from 1992-2005 finds that people
do not have strong views about PR. 116 Although more people agreed than
disagreed that Britain should have PR so that the number of MPs in the House
of Commons matches more closely the number votes each party gets, one in
three neither agreed nor disagreed or said they dont know. There was also
no change in the popularity of PR found in the survey after the 2005 election
relative to earlier years, suggesting that the outcome of the election did not
impact on public opinion.
When asked if more specifically change the voting system for General
elections to the UK House of Commons to allow smaller political parties to get
a fairer share of MPs [or] keep the voting system for the House of Commons
as it is to produce effective government which comes closer to your view
change or keep as it is? around three in five said they wanted to keep the
current electoral system (p130). This study finds that when the questions
emphasize the fact that the small parties might be the principal beneficiaries of
PR and that it might be at the expense of effective government, opinion sways
against PR. This study does not find any change in public opinion since the
2005 election in one direction or another and demonstrates a tension in public
attitudes between proportionality and the influence of small parties.
Determining the government
One advantage of FPTP is that the winner is usually easily identified and largely
undisputed. Under some PR systems that have preferential voting, such as STV,
the outcome of an election could have been different if a different electoral
system were in use to aggregate the ballots and determine the overall result.
A potential source of an anomalous result under preferential voting concerns
the issue of monotonicity, in which a candidates chances of being elected
could possibly be harmed by an increase in their share of the vote (refer to
Farrell 2001 p148-149 for an example). While the circumstances in which this
could happen are expected to be very rare, under systems such as STV there is
greater complexity in determining the winner than under FPTP.
Conclusion
Both PR and FPTP are associated with stable and effective governments. FPTP
in the UK has tended to produce a clear majority winner with governments
serving full term, although with the current relatively strong third party, a hung
parliament, and a coalition/minority government is more likely in the future
than previously. PR increases the chances of coalition government and with a
greater number of parties involved, can increase the chance of instability and
more frequent elections or changes of government, although there are many
examples of stable and effective coalition governments. However, the debate
also centres on the nature of governments. FPTP often produces an undisputed
winner and can award the winning party with a surplus of seats to govern
without necessarily being dependent on a coalition. Governments under PR are
often determined by parties who can strike the best deal and enter coalitions
or other kinds of arrangements in order to govern, with voters having little
influence on these negotiations. There is a tension in public attitudes between
agreeing with the merits of greater proportionality but being cautious about
increasing the number of parties represented in Parliament. However there has
been no shift in public opinion towards PR as a result of the last FPTP elections
of 2005.
D Impact on the voter effective choices, ease of voting
and connection with representatives
(i) Effective choices
Different voting systems give voters different choices about a candidate. David
Farrell provides a useful typology that characterises the degree of choice voting
systems provide in relation to the extent of choice and the nature of choice
provided by the ballot:
In this typology FPTP provides only one choice but voters can make this choice
in terms of the candidate they select in their constituency, fostering a strong
constituency-representative link. STV provides a greater extent of choice
between candidates as voters can rank them according to their preferences. AV
would sit between FPTP and STV in this typology as it provides voters with the
ability to indicate their preferences between candidates but only elect one final
candidate. AMS is a mixed system, and therefore provides a categorical choice
of a candidate and a party (two votes).
One of the main arguments advanced in favour of some form of PR is that
it will make everyones vote count in some way, giving voters better choices
and therefore giving more people an incentive to vote. The cause and effect is
complex, as the section on turn-out shows, but there is considerable concern
amongst commentators about the effectiveness of peoples choices and votes
under FPTP.
Effective choices can be viewed in a number of ways. The ERS report on
the 2005 General election118 calculates that 68 percent of peoples votes
were wasted, in the sense that they were either cast for losing candidates
(50 percent of total votes) or were surplus to requirements in individual
constituencies (a further 18 percent).
Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts, in
Britain Votes 2005,119 look at the
effectiveness of peoples choices by calculating whether voters were successful
in the sense that their chosen party came out on top at one or more of
three levels: constituency, regional and national. The only triple winners were
some Labour voters, with just over 20 percent falling into the category. Triple
losers accounted for 37 percent of voters. But overall, 63 percent of voters in
Great Britain got something they wanted, in that their party was successful
at least at one of the three levels. The question here will be how many people
think about the regional level, given that the two main outcomes are electing a
constituency MP and a national government.
Another perspective on choice and influence is provided by the New
Economics Foundation (NEF), through its Index of Democratic Power (IDP).120
For each parliamentary constituency, this takes into account the likelihood of
the seat changing hands and the number of electors per seat. A score of 100 is
said to give all electors in the constituency their full fair share of democratic
power. A constituency of average size with a previous marginal result would fit
the bill. Cheadle, in Greater Manchester, is said to be the closest to the ideal,
with a score of 100.2. The highest score of all is Na-h-Eileanan at 131. On the
other end of the scale, the electors of Bootle face an IDP score of 0.07. The
average IDP score is 19.4, which means, according to the NEF, that 80 percent
of democratic power in General elections is not exercised. This is rooted in the
fact that since 1955, there have been 13 General elections, resulting in five
changes of government in Westminster yet only 11 percent of seats have
actually changed hands.
Around the UK there are also many constituencies which are regarded as safe
for one particular party. It seems likely, therefore, that potential voters in many
areas of the UK may feel their vote will not influence the outcome. There is
no firm proof that this leads to disengagement, but it is reasonable to suppose
that it is a contributory factor for some.
Other electoral systems, either through some form of proportional list system
or the distribution of second preference votes, might allow voters to feel
that they have an influence on the choice of representatives, even if it may
seem indirect, particularly when representatives are chosen from a closed list
system, as is the case in the European Parliamentary elections and for the
regional elements of the Scottish, Welsh and London Assemblies. For example,
in Northern Ireland under STV small parties have a greater chance of getting
seats if they gain around one percent of votes at the national level and around
10 percent of the votes at the individual constituency level.121
The ICPR looked at ways in which voters are able to exercise choice under PR
systems.122 Under AMS, significant numbers of voters have split the ticket,
voting for one party for the constituent seat and another for the regional list.
In the elections in Scotland, Wales and London, between 1999-2003, between
17 percent and 28 percent of voters split their tickets. Ticket-splitting could be,
for example, a pragmatic vote for a large party candidate in the constituency
and then a smaller party for the regional list. Or it could be confusion, as some
observers have suggested that some voters think that the regional list vote is
a second preference vote, as was noted earlier. The ICPR takes the view that
in Scotland in 2003, for example, voters were exercising deliberate choices.
Split-ticket voting was particularly prevalent amongst supporters of the Greens
and Scottish Socialists, who knew that their candidates stood little chance
of gaining constituency seats, but could win seats through the list systems.
Consequently the Greens won seven seats and the Scottish Socialists six seats
in the Scottish Parliament in 2003.
Under an SV system (as used for the London and other Mayoral elections) a
voter can vote for a desired representative of a smaller party as first preference
and still cast a second vote for a larger party candidate who may be more likely
to win. Voter choice can be considered to be limited under SV because the only
way a vote can affect the final result is if the voter votes for the most likely
candidates to go through to the second round. Because the system assumes
that the contest is likely to be between two established parties, it does not
reflect the environment for Mayoral elections where independents and other
parties also achieve a broad level of support. If a voter wants to ensure their
vote helps elect someone, they need to know and have a preference for at least
one of the top two candidates.
Under STV, voters can vote for as many candidates as they wish, in order of
preference, allowing choice of party and individuals. They can rank all or as
many candidates as they like. Because small parties have a greater chance of
being elected, they field candidates in more constituencies, which also gives
voters a greater range of choice.
Choice is more restricted in the European Parliamentary closed list system, but
the proportionality of the system does at least give the voter the chance to
vote for a smaller party and see a candidate from that party elected. The most
striking example of this in 2004 was the election of 12 UKIP MEPs.
Different systems can provide different opportunities for parties, therefore
affecting the formation of parties and campaigning strategies. Duverger
(mentioned in the Section A on proportionality) claimed that PR would tend to
lead to multiple parties over time and that FPTP would tend to produce a two-
party system, although this was is not an iron-caste rule.123 Research measuring
the number of effective parliamentary parties under different systems has
shown that there is a tendency for more parties under PR than under FPTP.124
Effective parties are identified by weighting each party by its size, determined
by share of its vote or seats won. The ICPR found that under PR in the UK,
elections have produced between three and four effective parliamentary
parties with STV in Northern Ireland the only system providing more than four
effective parties.125 This is not just because PR systems allocate more seats
to small parties but also because more people vote for small parties when PR
is in place. This is a typical increase of one to two more parties by comparison
to Westminster. However, while Westminster followed the Duverger rule of
having two main parties for many years, there are currently three effective
parliamentary parties under FTPT and it is no longer a two party system (the
Liberal Democrats creating a significant third party along with Labour and the
Conservatives).126
Conclusion
FPTP provides categorical choice across candidates and parties but only gives
voters one chance to influence the outcome and many voters may not have
this opportunity in reality. STV provides ordinal choices and greater scope
for voters to select between candidates and parties, with greater potential to
choose the winner, and fewer wasted votes. Choice is also enhanced under
AMS because voters can choose a consituency and list candidate through two
votes. Closed party lists offer the least choice but, like STV a greater chance of
seeing the elected candidate win.
(ii) Ease of voting and understanding the implications
The previous section showed that under the newer electoral systems in the UK,
voters are able to exercise a greater degree of choice and have more chance
of their vote being effective in the election of a party or candidate. However,
with choice comes the potential for confusion, both about how to vote and
about the effect of ones choices. One of the virtues of the FPTP system is its
simplicity. In General elections the voter simply chooses one candidate and the
one with the most votes wins the seat.
How to vote
In 1998, before the introduction of a new voting system for the European
Parliamentary elections, Patrick Dunleavy and colleagues conducted trials
of mock ballot papers distinguishing between open and closed list systems.
They established that most people could complete the ballot papers without
difficulty and had a marginal preference for the more complex open list system.
In 2003, the ICPR and National Centre for Social Research surveyed Welsh
and Scottish voters after the 2003 elections127. They found that while some
voters found it difficult to understand how the votes translated into seats, only
11 percent of voters found the ballot papers difficult to fill in.
One way of measuring how difficult voters find the new voting systems is to
look at the number of invalid votes cast, comparing them where possible with
FPTP equivalents. However, it is important to acknowledge the complexities
and limitations of using invalid vote rates.
There are several different categories of invalid (spoiled or rejected) votes. The
main categories of invalid votes are when a voter makes more votes than
entitled or leaves the ballot uncertain or blank. More votes than entitled
can be assumed to show failure of voters to understand the process, but
uncertain or blank votes are more difficult to assess as they may have been
deliberate or in error. While overall invalid votes may increase or decrease, the
composition of invalid categories may differ by category. Also it is difficult to
make conclusions about causality, as voter confusion is likely to be affected
by multiple aspects such as the rules of the new system, having a combined
election, the design of ballot paper and other factors such as the literacy of the
voter.
Analysing invalid voting rates also is difficult because the data is not consistent
and comparable across constituencies and elections, and there are varying
administrative practices and local standards of what is considered acceptable
by returning officers. Whilst we cannot control for all the factors that impact
on spoiled votes, our analysis differentiates between combined and non-
combined elections to try and observe the difference in spoiled ballots for
different systems.
The following figure sets out invalid voting rates by elections, differentiating
between combined and non-combined elections.
Overall there are more invalid votes in the new electoral systems with
combined elections compared to un-combined General elections. With the
exception of Scotland in 1999, all combined elections have relatively high
invalid vote rates.
The problem of high invalid votes seems to have been most acute in the
London Assembly and Mayoral elections. In 2004 a combined total of 570,328
votes across both elections were invalid (although categories of invalid votes
vary, as discussed further below).129 This amounted to 7.2 percent of the total
votes cast in both elections (about 7.7 million).
The 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections also saw a striking increase in
the number of invalid votes where the Parliamentary and local government
elections were combined. Although the 1999 combined election in Scotland
had very low rates of invalid votes, the 2007 election saw a very high number
of invalid votes where the local government election changed from FPTP to
STV, a combined rate of 3.47 percent. The local government elections had a
total of 38,352 or 1.83 percent invalid ballots, compared with 0.64 percent in
the 2003 local government election under FPTP. The Scottish Parliamentary
elections saw a total of 146,099 ballot papers rejected.130 Of these, 60,455 or
2.88 percent were regional ballots and 85,644 or 4.1 percent were constituency
ballots.
There was a notable decrease in the number of spoiled ballots in Northern
Ireland non-combined elections, down to just under one percent in 2007
compared with 1.5 percent in 2003. Wales followed a similar pattern, with
invalid vote numbers decreasing between 2003 and 2007.
General elections have had the lowest percentage of invalid votes. In 2005
where the General election was combined with other elections (i.e. with multi-
member FPTP voting in local elections in England and STV in local elections in
Northern Ireland) the rate of invalid votes increased, though it remained under
1 percent.
We can see that generally, when there are combined elections held on the
same day there is a greater likelihood of increased invalid votes. However,
the factor contributing to invalid voting rates may not necessarily be the
combining of elections themselves, as discussed in the cases below.
The design of the ballot paper (constituency and list candidates appeared on
the same ballot) may have contributed to voter confusion and invalid votes
in the London elections. The London 2004 Elections Review Committee (ERC)
report on the Greater London Authority Elections, 131 put forward a number
of reasons for the number of invalid votes cast, mainly relating to the design
of the ballot papers and inadequate voter instructions. Their analysis for the
2004 London Mayor elections found a large number of the invalid votes
(271,117) could have been due to voters legitimately choosing not to exercise
their second preference. However the ERC also noted that the numbers not
indicating their first preferences (24,534 first preference Mayoral votes that
were unmarked / uncertain and 56,243 Mayoral second preference votes
with no valid first choice) suggested voter confusion arising from poor ballot
paper design and inadequate instructions. On the Assembly votes under the
AMS system, the largest categories of invalid votes for the constituency and
list (regional) votes was uncertain or blank, 113,442 and 33,309 respectively.
There was also a pattern of more invalid votes in socially deprived areas with
high numbers of people with low levels of education.
The 2007 Scottish Elections Review (SER) did not find sufficient evidence
to suggest that the simultaneous local government elections using STV
contributed substantially to the invalid vote rates, despite the Arbuthnott
Commissions recommendation to de-couple these elections.132 Rather, the
SER point to voter confusion due to the combined Scottish Parliamentary
ballot paper that included both the regional and constituency votes on one
ballot sheet, with the regional ballot on the left column and the constituency
ballot on a column on the right. The Arbuthnott Commission had suggested
exploring a new design, such as combined ballot papers as used in other
countries such as New Zealand. The SER analysis of invalid votes found that
in the parliamentary elections, four percent of voters had one or both parts of
their ballot paper rejected. Of these, 75 percent of voters (or three percent of
all voters) left one side unmarked, while marking the other side correctly (the
valid votes were accepted and the blanks rejected).133
The most plausible explanation found was that some voters did not know or
understand that they had two votes in the AMS system based on the way
the ballot paper was designed. Voters who did not read or understand the
instructions may have drifted naturally to the left, and the constituency side
on the right may have looked like a continuation of the regional list to some
voters. This may have particularly been the case in Glasgow and Lothians
where the lists were longer and last minute changes to ballot papers resulted in
abbreviated instructions. Rejected ballot papers were markedly higher in these
regions, where social deprivation is also greater than other regions.
The SER point out that in combined elections where separate ballot papers
were used for the AMS election (as in Wales in 1999, 2003 and 2007 and
in Scotland in 1999 and 2003), the ballot paper rejection rates ranged from
0.36 percent and 1.39 percent. This is significantly lower than the examples of
combined elections in London and Scotland where the AMS election used a
single ballot paper for both votes discussed above.
The experience in these elections suggests that ballot paper design and
information to voters is critical. We have not found analysis that points to
particular combinations of elections causing greater invalid voting, although
the ERS have argued that there is a causal relationship between having more
than one election on the same day and invalid votes, even if the same system
is used.134
Conclusion
There does not appear to be conclusive evidence that any one particular
voting system is more confusing for the voter, in terms of casting their votes
correctly, than any other system. Overall FPTP has the least number of invalid
votes but what can be seen is that generally in combined elections, there is an
increased level of invalid votes. However, the causes are not necessarily that
elections are combined with different voting systems in operation. The cases
of the combined elections in London in 2004 and Scotland in 2007 show
that ballot paper design and the information provided to voters are critical
factors contributing to invalid votes. Social deprivation and demographic
characteristics of constituencies may also have a part to play in invalid voting
rates. Given the limitations in the data on invalid voting it is difficult to assess
reliably the nature of relationships between different combined systems and if
some are better than others.
Understanding the outcome of the vote
The ICPR found no evidence from 1999 surveys
that not understanding
how the voting system worked dissuaded people from voting. It points out
that this finding is borne out in other countries, such as Germany, which have
AMS: Many German voters do not understand the purpose or significance
of their second vote, but despite this, the German system is popular with its
electorate.
The ICPR surveys of voters in the 2003 elections in Scotland and Wales
found that less than half of all respondents felt that they understood AMS, with
about the same proportion saying that they did not understand it (with not
sures making up the difference). Recent elections saw a marked improvement
in understanding of the new systems. In Wales, compared with 2003, the 2007
election saw a notable improvement in voter knowledge, where 53 percent felt
they knew a great deal or a fair amount about the voting system, compared
with 40 percent previously. In Wales a substantial minority of 37 percent felt
they knew not very much and 10 percent nothing at all in 2007, compared
with 58 percent saying they knew not very much or nothing at all in 2003.
In the London Mayor and London Assembly elections, the Electoral
Commissions opinion survey found that 57 percent were satisfied with the
amount of information they were provided on the Mayoral candidates but only
34 percent were satisfied with the information about the London Assembly
elections. This may have potentially contributed to the high invalid voting rate
in the AMS system in 2004, as discussed in the section on ease of voting and
understanding the implications above.
Conclusion
Whilst there is evidence that voters do not need to understand how the
outcome of the election is determined to vote effectively, voter knowledge
may still impact on successful voting and on whether people vote at all, as set
out in Section B on voter participation.
(iii) Connection with representatives
Another of the merits of FPTP put forward by its proponents is that
constituency representatives have close ties to their electorate and other
citizens locally. They are accountable to all their constituents, not just
those who voted for them, and have strong incentives to take up issues on
their behalf, given that they will face re-election at some point. In the UK,
constituencies on average have around 70,000 registered electors, which is a
relatively small number by international standards, so the quality of contact
between MP and constituents could be relatively high.
Many MPs do indeed undertake a great deal of valuable constituency work, as
well as fulfilling other important functions, such as scrutinising parliamentary
legislation and representing the interests of their constituency and party
in the House of Commons. The current debate on democratic engagement
does, however, suggest that more could be done to connect MPs and local
parties with their constituents. For example, a survey of Internet users after
the 2005 General election revealed that 93 percent of people did not expect
to be contacted by their MP until the next General election campaign.137 The
Electoral Commission and Hansard Society have conducted audits of political
engagement for the past three years.138 The surveys have consistently shown
that engagement at local level remains low, despite the incentives provided by
the FPTP system. Only 44 percent of those surveyed in 2006 knew their MPs
name, whilst over the three years of the survey 13-17 percent of people said
they had contacted their local MP over the previous two or three years.139
The existence of a large number of safe seats may also weaken the
accountability argument advanced in favour of the FPTP system. In an article
on compulsory voter turn-out published in the Hansard Societys Democracy
Series, Chris Ballinger observes that: In the 2005 UK General election, the
battle was fought not in 646 constituencies, but in about 100 key target
seats. The electorate responded to this targeting Electors, it seemed, felt
unmotivated to vote for safely incumbent Government MPs. They were more
motivated to vote in those seats in which the opportunity to influence the
result was most marked which were also the seats in which the parties
conducted their most active campaigning.140
The ICPR
looked at the degree of constituency involvement by
representatives under the newer electoral systems. It found that under AMS in
Scotland and Wales, the role of the constituency representative is much the
same as under the Westminster system. The role of regional list representatives
was somewhat less constituency based, although many of those
representatives may hold ambitions to become constituency representatives
and do, of course, require a profile to be well placed on future regional lists. So
they do take an interest in constituents issues and have had some conflicts
with constituency representatives.
As we have seen in Chapter 5 on the experience of the devolved jurisdictions,
the tension between constituency and list representatives in Scotland and in
Wales has been perhaps the biggest single concern about the effect of AMS.
The Government of Wales Act 2006 banned dual candidacy to address the
tensions arising between the two classes of elected members under AMS. The
2007 Welsh Assembly elections were the first time candidates were obliged to
choose to contest either a constituency or in a regional list and could not stand
on both as was previously the case, and is the norm under AMS in most other
countries.
The continued focus on constituency work may be a reflection that AMS is
new to the UK, and representatives behaviour still mirrors that under the
FPTP system, even though it has been in place for three terms. The ICPR142 also
looked at New Zealand and Germany, which have AMS. In Germany there
is less of a tradition of constituency service and relatively little difference
between the roles of constituency and list representatives. In New Zealand,
where AMS has been in place since 1996, list members have developed a
strategic role, but they are also assigned geographical responsibilities by their
parties. Some list members have previously been constituency representatives
and are therefore keen to maintain constituency contacts. Because the
constituencies are larger than they used to be under FPTP, constituency MPs
now have larger caseloads than before.
STV systems are specifically designed to maintain contact between
representatives and their constituents, while delivering proportional outcomes.
The ICPR143 suggests that in the Republic of Ireland, because candidates need
to distinguish themselves from fellow party candidates as well as other parties,
there has been an increased emphasis on local or single issues, particularly in
rural areas. Proponents of STV argue that the connection between constituents
and their elected representative is stronger as voters have greater choice
between MPs representing their constituency and can approach several
different MPs based on their preference for a party or individual.
The closed list system for the European Parliamentary elections, based on large
regions, is not conducive to constituency casework, although a survey of 61
MEPs carried out by David Farrell and Roger Scully between 2001-3144 found
that British MEPs feel that they do more casework than their counterparts in
other EU countries. The large size of the regions they represent does, however,
make it difficult to make a strong connection with individual communities. If
there is a trend since 1999, it is away from casework to an ambassadorial role
for the region.
Conclusion
In conclusion, FPTP has the simplest direct relationship between representative
and constituent. STV also allows for a direct relationship, but there are a
number of potentially competitive representatives and greater choice for the
electorate. AMS allows for the direct relationship, but has the complication
of party list representatives being seen as competitors and somehow second
order, by constituency representatives. However, choice is enhanced under AMS
because a member of the electorate can either approach one constituency
member or any of the regional list members. The closed party list establishes
the least connection. Whether the connection between constituents and
representatives is stronger under FPTP and STV (both candidate based
systems) depends on ones perspective about whether there should be single or
multi-member constituencies and representatives.
E Social representativeness
This analysis of social representation focuses on gender and ethnic minority
representation. Other categories such as age or socio-economic status are not
examined due to limited research on these topics.
In the 2005 General election, 126 women were elected to the House of
Commons an historic high. This is almost 20 percent of the total MPs, a figure
which is still relatively low by standards elsewhere in Europe and well below
the proportion of women in the population (50.9 percent in mid 2005).145
For example, women comprise 47.3 percent of the total MPs in Sweden, 36.7
percent in the Netherlands, and 42 percent in Finland.146 Whilst these countries
have more proportional voting systems, other countries with PR do not share
such high levels of representation of women, with Italy at 17.3 percent and
Ireland at 13.3 percent. The position in devolved jurisdictions is better than the
House of Commons. The proportion of women in the Scottish Parliament is 33
percent (43 women) and in Wales 47 percent (28 women). The Welsh Assembly
was the first legislative body in the world to achieve parity between numbers
of men and women elected in 2003 (50 percent). In 2006 following a by-
election, there were two more female representatives than males, although the
proportion of women dropped to 47 percent in 2007.
Around three-quarters of female MPs for the House of Commons were from
the Labour Party, which has adopted all-women shortlists for some safe seats.
All new female Labour MPs elected in 2005 were selected from all-women
shortlists. No other party adopted this approach, although the Conservatives
have sought to improve their selection processes and the Liberal Democrats
have sought to give support to women candidates, through mentoring, training
and financial support. The current level of womens representation in the
Commons is potentially dependant on Labours majority, due to Labours policy
of positive action in the mid-1990s and the use of all-women shortlists after
2002. The impact of these policies has been significant, with the 1997 elections
seeing the number of female MPs double, from 60 in 1992 to 120 in 1997, of
which 101 were Labour MPs.147
In the 2005 General election, 15 MPs from a black and minority ethnic (BME)
background were elected, marginally up from 13 in 2001. The first ethnic
minority member of the Welsh Assembly was elected on the regional ballot
representing Plaid Cymru in 2007, and for the Northern Ireland Assembly,
the first Chinese politician was also elected in 2007. As the Electoral Reform
Society points out, if the representation of BME groups in the House of
Commons reflected the make up of the population (7.9 percent BME), there
would be 51 BME MPs.148 When young people from BME groups are surveyed
about why many of them feel disengaged from the political process, many cite
the fact that they cannot relate to their representatives, so few of whom seem
to speak directly for them.
In its 2002 research report on voter engagement among BME communities,
The Electoral Commission states that It is an oversimplification to assume that
the presence of BME representatives ensures representation of BME concerns
and interests... However the importance of the presence of BME representatives
in elected office is clear in terms of giving messages about the openness of the
system and encouraging the participation of BME communities.149 We have
not found specific research on different voting systems and their impact on
BME voters in the UK.
The introduction of party list systems, both for the European Parliamentary
elections and the regional lists for Scotland, Wales and London, can provide an
opportunity for political parties to address the gender and ethnic imbalances
amongst their candidates, then flowing into electoral outcomes.
As far as gender is concerned, the composition of the Scottish, Welsh
and London Assemblies suggest that significant progress has been made,
although in the most recent elections the number of women dropped in both
Scotland and Wales, and remained unchanged in Northern Ireland. Following
respective elections, 36 percent of the London Assembly, 46.7 percent of the
National Assembly for Wales, and 33.3 percent of the Scottish Parliament
representatives are women.150 However, contrary to what one might expect,
the percentages are higher in Scotland and Wales for constituency than list
representatives, although when compared internationally, the pattern in
Scotland and Wales has been an exception rather than the norm. This is largely
attributed to the Labour Partys twinning arrangement for female and male
constituency candidates to ensure balance in Scotland and Wales in the 1990s.
In Wales, Plaid Cymru is the only party that has more women representatives
through the lists rather than constituencies (in 2001, five from the list and two
from constituencies), due to their policy of placing a female candidate at the
top of each list. Northern Ireland has a poor record of womens representation
(16.7 percent in 2007, unchanged from 2003). However, in the London
Assembly there are almost equal numbers of constituency and list members
who are women.
Surprisingly perhaps, given that the closed list is theoretically the easiest
for parties to control, womens representation is relatively low amongst
UK Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) at almost 26 percent
(20 female).151 This was partly influenced by the fact that in the most recent
election none of UKIPs 12 elected MEPs was a woman, and Labour, which
tends to have more female candidates than other large parties, lost seats.
In comparison, 38 percent of Irish MEPs were female in 2004.152 As put by
Julie Ballington of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2007), political parties can,
regardless of the voting system, remain gatekeepers to the advancement of
women in politics.153
For BME groups, the London Assembly (8 percent) and UK members of the
European Parliament (4.6 percent)154 have higher representation than the
House of Commons (2 percent). Improvements could be made across all voting
systems in terms of the participation of BME groups although in this area it
is not clear if a change to the voting system would have a significant impact.
Positive action is likely to have a significant impact but can be difficult and
controversial to implement.
The devolved jurisdictions have shown how progress can be made in
improving gender representativeness, if the parties select a better balance of
candidates in the first place. The ICPR also suggests that this is not so much
because of PR, but because these were new Assemblies, with no incumbents
blocking winnable seats.155 However, in theory PR is described as facilitating
the encouragement of the selection and election of more women but does
not guarantee it. Since generally under PR multiple seats can be won per
district, the turnover of incumbents is likely to be greater. In combination
with some parties taking positive action, there has been improved gender
representativeness in the UK. On this point however, the Arbuthnott
Commission, when considering STV for Scotland, considered that STV would
make positive action policies more difficult for parties to implement to
promote more gender and ethnic minority representations. Whilst the electoral
system is not the only determining factor, international experience suggests
that those countries with some form of proportional representation have
better womens representation.156
Conclusion
In the UK, the devolved jurisdictions have achieved better womens
representation compared to Westminster but significant contributions have
also been made by positive action policies. A much higher proportion of
women have been elected to the Scottish, Welsh and London Assemblies than
is the case for the House of Commons (or in Europe and Northern Ireland). List
systems may help, but the driving factor has probably been the Labour Partys
twinning arrangement for male and female candidates in constituency seats
in those Assemblies.
All systems in the United Kingdom need improvement in terms of
representation of BME groups.
F Impact on political campaigning
One of the criticisms levelled at the FPTP systems, especially with ever more
sophisticated use of media by political parties, is that it encourages parties
to concentrate campaigning on marginal seats at the time of an election. For
example the ERS point out that in campaigning for the 2005 General election
the major parties were estimated to have focused on only 800,000 electors
who were considered to be swing voters in marginal constituencies.157
The Jenkins Commission pointed out how FPTP narrows the terrain over
which the political battle is fought meaning that political parties focused
their efforts on about a hundred or at most 150 swingable constituencies
[in 1997].158
The Power Inquiry was also critical of the current style of political campaigning
in Britain. It argued that the main political parties concentrate electoral energy
on the marginal seats which are subject to swing votes whilst appeasing the
core vote with a handful of policies.159
Under FPTP outside these targeted seats, there may be relatively little
campaigning, especially by senior politicians from the major parties. This
situation may have been exacerbated by the financial constraints faced by
all the parties. The risk inherent in this focus on marginals is that most of the
public conclude that the political parties are not interested in them. This is one
factor which may contribute to political disengagement, although Curtice et
al did not find any evidence of this when comparing FPTP with other voting
systems. In their study of legislative elections held in recent years under various
voting systems, in those elections using FPTP, 39 percent said a candidate
or someone from a political party has been in contact with them during
the campaign whereas in countries with other systems only 21 percent of
respondents said this was the case. Yet the critique of FPTP around the focus
on marginal seats remains. So, are campaigning strategies and tactics different
under other voting systems?
Under AMS, the ICPR
observes that we might expect at least three effects.
First, parties might have an incentive to campaign everywhere because there
are regional list votes to be won. There may also be a difference in constituency
and list campaigning, the latter being more focused on regional issues, although
this may be less likely if candidates are standing for both constituency and list
seats. Second, parties may be encouraged to adopt more distinctive ideological
positions in order to capture niche electoral markets. Third, despite more
ideological stances, they might be expected to refrain from outright attacks on
parties that they might be in coalition with after the elections.
In the experience of the devolved jurisdictions it is not clear yet if AMS
has reduced the tendency for parties to concentrate on marginal seats in
campaigns. The larger parties, including the SNP and Plaid Cymru have
continued to target marginal seats and this was important in both the
2003 and 2007 elections.161 For Plaid Cymru, the ICPR observes that they
deliberately concentrated on constituency seats because they did not want
to be perceived as having limited opportunities to win in constituency seats.
This suggested that list seats were being considered lower priority seats. This
is despite Plaid Cymru being one of the major beneficiaries of the list system.
In 2007 Plaid Cymru increased their vote share by two constituency seats and
one more list seat. The focus on marginal seats has boosted SNP dominance in
the Scottish Assembly and Plaid Cymrus in the Welsh Assembly, largely due to
the relative paucity of list seats.162 The Electoral Commissions reports of 2003
on the elections in Scotland163 and Wales164 reinforce the ICPRs findings that
the focus is on winning key constituencies.
In terms of campaigning for the list seats, only a few small parties took
advantage of the new system to good effect. In Scotland, the small parties such
as the Greens and Scottish Socialists specifically targeted list votes in 2003
with some measure of success. These small parties focused their campaigns
on winning list votes because they had little hope of winning constituency
seats. For example the Green Party also did not have any candidates in the
constituency contests and the Liberal Democrats in Scotland encouraged
Labour voters to split their ticket on the grounds that their second vote for
Labour would not help get anyone from Labour elected.165 The large increase in
the number of parties campaigning for the list vote in Wales in 2007 suggest
a change in campaigning behaviour to take advantage of list opportunities.
However, the four major parties have dominated all the seats in Wales (Labour,
Plaid Cymru, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats) and no smaller party has
won a list seat since the introduction of AMS in Wales.
The campaigns in the 2003 elections were of low intensity, especially in
Wales, where the Electoral Commission was particularly concerned about
the lack of profile and information the public received about the elections.
Some of this lack of intensity was the result of the fact that the elections are
still seen as second order by many people in comparison with the General
election. However the situation improved in the 2007 elections. The Electoral
Commission found significant improvements in the 2007 Wales elections
in terms of turn-out as well as greater public knowledge about the Welsh
Assembly and greater publicity of elections.
Voting systems also impact on the manner of political campaigning. FPTP,
described as the winner takes all system, is said to lead to adversarial
campaigning and an emphasis on defeating opponents, largely due to the
seat surplus awarded to winning parties. Some argue that this contributes
to voter disengagement.166 Advocates of PR (and particularly STV) argue that
PR encourages political parties to differentiate themselves from other parties
(rather than all competing for the middle ground) widening the choices
presented to electors as well as reducing adversarial politics.167 Parties who may
need to find coalition partners after an election are unlikely to engage in dirty
politics beforehand to ensure they have the support to form a government.
Under AMS there seems to be a continued adversarial approach in the
campaign for constituency seats, particularly with the focus on marginal
seats and small majorities in Scotland and Wales. Additionally there seems
to be adversarial relations between different kinds of candidates in-between
elections, such as in Wales before 2007, after which dual candidacy was
abolished. Under STV, the ERS argue that in Northern Ireland parties of the
extremes have themselves moved closer to the centre, although they point
out that voters continue to be reluctant to cross the community divide by
transferring their votes to other parties.168 This suggests that adversarial
relations between parties can continue regardless of the voting system,
although in the case of Northern Ireland some of this may be due to the
specific socio-political history and context. Because STV provides high levels
of intra-party choice between candidates, this can create a tendency for
decentralised campaigning and emphasising individual candidates, resulting in
the potential for faction-fighting between candidates of the same party.
Campaigning for the European Parliamentary elections presents another set
of challenges, with the closed list system meaning that candidates are little
known by electors. Votes will therefore be geared towards the parties. There is
only limited transnational campaigning. Interest in the European Parliament
remains low, despite the importance of the legislation it passes. And while the
major parties had quite distinct positions on the European Union, their own
campaigns in 2004 focused on a wider range of issues than Europe, including,
in the Liberal Democrats case, Iraq. The campaign was galvanised, however, by
the anti-European messages of UKIP, which won 12 seats at the election. Other
factors, such as the controversy surrounding all-postal voting, may also have
heightened interest in the elections. A study by ICM and Professor John Curtice
also found that traditional activities such as personal canvassing and providing
people with the right amount and sort of information helped turn-out169. As a
result of all these factors, turn-out at the European Parliamentary elections was
higher than ever before, at 38 percent.
Conclusion
The broad conclusion to be drawn thus far about campaigning under the new
electoral systems is that there has been relatively little change in the focus of
campaigns. Although some small parties have been able to take advantage of
strategic campaigning for the list seats under AMS, wider national issues and
traditional constituency-based tactics tend to predominate. The role of UKIP
in the 2004 European Parliamentary elections, and the Greens and Scottish
Socialists in the 2003 Scottish Parliament elections, are exceptions. It may
be that lessons learned from these experiences may lead to more distinctive
approaches from the larger parties in time.
G Impact on administration of elections
The administration of elections can have a significant impact on the integrity
in elections and public confidence in the democratic process. The Electoral
Commission is tasked with setting standards for running elections and
reporting on how well elections are run.
Chapter 5 outlined the Electoral Commissions analysis of the elections in
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and for the European Parliament since 1997.
This chapter also outlined the findings of the GLA Elections Review Committee
for the London elections of 2004. As well as the common theme of low
turn-out, all of these reviews reflected on the increasing challenges faced by
electoral administrators and returning officers in running successful elections
and in playing their part in providing effective information to the electorate
where new systems have introduced. Most recommendations for improvement
concerned improving information available to voters, addressing inconsistent
practice in regions in terms of ballot paper design, count practices, promotion
of postal voting and candidate nominations procedures. Also, invalid votes were
a concern in the London Assembly and London Mayor elections in 2004 and
Scotland in 2007.
It is difficult to distinguish between the effect of particular voting systems and
that of other reforms on the administration of elections. The difficulties faced
by electoral officers in recent years have been the result of many factors, but
in particular, the demands of increased postal voting, the challenges presented
by the combination of different elections and changes to electoral legislation,
some of which was not delivered early enough to give administrators the
certainty they need to plan well ahead. Other challenges include efforts to
modernise electoral administration, such as introducing electronic counting of
votes and e-voting.
New electoral systems have simply been a part of the challenge, and electoral
officers have in the main responded well. All elections have taken place as
planned and electoral petitions after the event have been few in number.
Nonetheless, the representative bodies of electoral officers (the Association
of Electoral Administrators (AEA) and the Electoral Matters Panel of the
Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE)) have warned about the
increasing pressures on their members. Any further changes to voting systems
in the UK will, therefore, need to take account of how the demands created by
new voting systems combine with other demands.
(i) Combined elections, complexity and the need for
consistency
Combining elections now appears to have become commonplace. There is
good reason for this, as it has been seen as good for turn-out, with voters only
having to attend the polling station or send their postal vote on one occasion
each year rather than twice (or more) over a relatively short period. Low
turn-out elections (typically local or European Parliamentary elections) have
particularly benefited from combination with either a General election, or
National Assembly/Parliamentary election. Combination does mean, however,
that electors, parties, candidates and administrators may be faced with more
than one voting system. This adds to the complexity of the elections and the
logistical demands (for example, printing ballot papers, postal voting packs and
counting votes).
Critics of PR and preferential systems often argue that complexities in the
ballot paper can confuse voters and inadvertently benefit some candidates
over others. For example, in the case of STV, they point to the weakness that
voters read down (or up) the list of candidate names and can potentially vote
sequentially (alphabetically) rather than by preference. This line of argument
suggests that because ballot papers are longer under STV, it is more taxing on
voters who have to read through the entire list of candidates and place a 1
next to the first name they recognise, a 2 next to the second and so on, until
all are completed. This is said to produce a biased result that favours those
candidates whose names start with letters at the beginning or end of the
alphabet. There has been evidence of this in Australian and Irish elections170
although there are several different ballot design and management techniques
to reduce the chance of this. This issue arose in the Scottish 2007 elections
where the SER found attempts by political parties to influence the design of
the ballot papers. This led the SER to recommend a more consistent approach
to naming political parties and an equitable system for positioning parties on
the ballot paper.171
The European Parliamentary, Greater London Assembly and London Mayor
elections were combined in 2004. Voters had the opportunity to cast five
different votes. The high percentage of invalid votes cast (see discussion and
Figure 5 in section D) suggests that significant numbers of voters did not find
this easy. The 2004 Elections Committee for London attributes a good deal
of the difficulty to inadequate information for voters (notwithstanding the
acclaimed booklet on Mayoral candidates), inconsistent approaches to polling
cards and poor ballot paper design. It also refers to inconsistent practices in
other areas of electoral administration. As a result the Committee proposes
stronger directive powers for the Greater London Returning Officer in the run
up to and during the 2008 elections.
The SER, when evaluating the administration of the 2007 combined Scottish
elections, highlighted problems of fragmented legislation, accountability, policy
development, planning and implementation of elections and deficiencies in
co-ordination and timely decision-making. Given that the administration of
elections is already quite complex, the fact that it was a combined election
and additional requirements were necessary to ensure electronic counting,
meant that there are multiple and over-lapping issues to be addressed. The
SER also recommend that before any further changes to electoral systems
or administration are proposed, that better research and user testing be
undertaken well before changes are to be implemented. On the case of
Scotland, the SER only suggested de-coupling elections as one option (the
other was changing the ballot paper design). Most of the recommendations
related to reducing complexity and improving co-ordination in the
administration of elections rather than to aspects of combining different
voting systems.
The need for electoral officers to play a greater role in the provision of
information about the elections and the need for greater consistency of
practice was echoed in The Electoral Commissions reports on the elections in
Scotland172 and Wales.173 The important issue is that in all these elections there
is a need for consistent information provision to ensure a level playing field for
voters across the region or country, and maintain a focus on what is best for
voters.174 While combined elections provide opportunities to improve turn-out,
they require better prepared information for voters and run an increased the
risk of invalid votes.
Conclusion
Combined elections and the use of different voting systems increase the
complexity for voters and bring into play the importance of the consistency of
information provided to voters and the design of the ballot papers. This requires
electoral officers to play a greater role in ensuring the success of such elections.
(ii) Counting the votes
Another area of elections where there has been concern about inconsistent
practices, and which is affected by differing voting systems, is the count. The
Electoral Commissions report on Welsh175 elections expressed concern at the
different approaches taken to the counting of the regional list votes the
top-up. Some returning officers did not begin verifying the list votes until the
constituency count had finished. Others verified the list votes at the same
time as counting the constituency votes, so that they could move on swiftly
to counting the list votes. This affected the timing of the announcement of the
result of the regional member elections, and the final declaration of the results
was not until 7.30am the day after the elections. Parties and candidates, as
well as the media, were particularly concerned about this and the Commission
recommended that public announcements of the timing of counts of future
elections should be made as early as possible.176
Counting takes even longer under STV, if conducted manually. In Northern
Ireland in 2003, the count began the day after the elections (which is standard
practice there for all elections) and took two days. In both 2003 and 2007
there was some criticism of the time taken to count votes but the transfer of
votes from one preference to another is a complex business and it is important
to get it right.
The greater complexity of counting in most proportional voting systems
has led to some use of electronic counting, with the likelihood that it will be
increasingly relied upon in the future. It was used successfully in the 2004
London combined elections as well as in Scotland in 2007.
Electronic counting works well, but does have some issues. Some are technical
and are likely to be ironed out over time. Others challenge some of the
traditional expectations around elections, such as the candidates being able to
get a feel of the progress of the count by observing the piles of ballot papers. In
the example of Scotland in 2007, the SER did not find evidence that electronic
counting contributed to the number of rejected ballot papers in Scotland.
The SER pointed out that the lateness of legislative and policy developments
created an environment where the technology, as a matter of necessity, began
to drive procedure. The SER recommended that electronic counting technology
be properly integrated into the electoral process and continue to be used in
Scotland for future local government elections.
The arrival of new voting systems requires all the participants in an election to
adapt, and since most changes in the UK are recent, some people may not be
satisfied and would prefer traditional practices.
Conclusion
The more complicated counting methodologies required for PR elections
means that vote counting takes longer than for FPTP. This has increased the
need for electronic counting, which has in turn has introduced new technical
challenges and changes to the way elections are traditionally run, in particular,
a need for greater planning. There is also need for greater consistency in
counting methods across elections.
(iii) Planning ahead
All of these practical concerns will need to be addressed seriously if there is
ever a decision to change the voting system for the Westminster elections.
A change to the voting system could not be viewed in isolation from the rest
of the electoral process. Any administrative defects would likely be attributed
to the change in the system even if the root causes lay elsewhere, and the
credibility of the elections could be affected. The SER advised if a different
ballot paper design, alternative instructions, new electoral systems or marking
systems are considered for future Scottish elections, a comprehensive research
and testing programme should be implemented under the guidance of
electoral practitioners.177
All the reports on recent elections in the UK using proportional systems call
for planning well in advance, for good project management and procurement
(especially for postal voting), and effective working between all stakeholders
in an election, including provision of information to the elector. Should
the Westminster elections move to a more complex voting system, the
Government may have to consider whether fixed term elections, or a longer
elections timetable following the announcement of the dissolution of
Parliament, are necessary in order to allow for effective preparations.
The administrative experience of the new voting systems introduced in the
UK has been varied with some key areas requiring better performance but
also with signs of some improvement over time (i.e. in Wales and Northern
Ireland). What can be concluded at this point is that combined elections are
administratively more challenging than individual elections and, given the
complex arrangements in the UK, more can be learned and improved in the
area of informing voters, ensuring consistency of administrative practices and
ballot paper design in combined elections. This includes undertaking sufficient
research and testing of any changes to electoral systems and administration.
Conclusions
Given the range of concerns around the need for consistent information,
greater lead-in times, consistent practice in counts and improved ballot paper
design, research and testing would be needed for elections to facilitate effective
planning if changes were proposed for Westminster. In the current complex
environment of multiple jurisdictions and multiple and sometimes combined
elections, careful consideration continues to be needed for running elections in
the future.
H Findings and Conclusions
As set out in the introduction, the purpose of this assessment is to contribute
to the knowledge base and debate on whether or not changes should be
made to the voting system for the House of Commons. It sets out to provide
objective information to contribute to this debate, not to make judgements
or recommendations that would be inherently political in nature. Attitudes
towards different voting systems can be highly influenced by the systems
impact on groups or parties that a person supports or opposes. Opinions,
and to some extent the interpretation of research findings, may also reflect
the values different people place on certain properties and characteristics
of representative democracy as practised in the House of Commons. Voting
systems are inherently a political topic and these value-based assumptions are
natural and unavoidable.
Outcomes Under Different Scenarios
There has been quite a lot of interest in what the outcomes for Westminster
could be under different voting systems. A number of studies have looked at
the impact of the different voting systems on offer by calculating what the
effect would be if they were used in the General election, given the numbers of
votes cast for each party and in which locality. A large number of assumptions
have to be made, especially about second preference or list voting, but they
can still give a useful indication of the proportionality or otherwise of different
systems. The following example is taken from the ERSs report on the 2005
General election.
In
Britain Votes 2005,179 Patrick Dunleavy and Helen Margetts run a similar
calculation, including assumptions about the effect under AMS with a 25
percent and 50 percent regional list top-up. The latter gives a little less to
Labour than C above, but the outcomes are broadly similar. AMS with 25
percent top-up delivers 275 seats for Labour, 203 for the Conservatives and
118 for the Liberal Democrats, 12 for UKIP, eight for the SNP, four for Plaid
Cymru, three for the Greens and one for the British National Party (BNP).
All systems other than FPTP and AV (with no top-up) would lead to coalition or
minority government following the 2005 election.
The major beneficiaries of new PR systems in 2005, when compared to
FPTP outcomes, would have been the Liberal Democrats. Labour would have
been the biggest losers; while the Conservatives would on the whole have
been affected only marginally by most systems. The worst system for the
Conservatives would have been AV, because the ERS analysis assumed that in
the 2005 election relatively few voters who principally favoured another party
would have put them as second choice.
Small parties, such as the Greens, UKIP and the BNP would have benefited
significantly from list-based systems, but once there is a strong constituency
basis to the voting system, even under STV, they would have been unlikely to
win many, if any, seats.
The Jenkins Commission proposed AV+ because it would increase
proportionality but with reasonable impacts on the current parties in
Parliament. There would be a moderate negative impact on Labour, a positive
impact on the Liberal Democrats, while leaving the Conservative position much
the same. It would, however, do little for the small parties who are currently
not represented at Westminster.
Concluding contributions to the debate
It is not possible for any one voting system to meet all the criteria set out in
this review, and therefore any conclusion drawn about which system is best for
Westminster will depend on the value placed on different criteria. We set out
below a brief summary of our findings and points of contribution.
In the experience of the UK since 1997, PR systems have produced more
proportional results than FPTP. STV (in Northern Ireland) has been the most
proportional, followed by the Party List system and AMS. However, while recent
General elections under FPTP have produced less proportional results, this has
not always been the case. For example, outcomes were more proportional
in the 1950s when the two main parties received the vast majority of votes
cast. Since the 1970s the number of two-party contests in constituencies has
declined sharply. Other factors (other than the voting system) that impact on
disproportionality are district magnitude and patterns of voter behaviour. While
there is a consensus about the factors contributing to proportionality and
disproportionality, there are different interpretations about which contributing
factors are problematic (e.g. district magnitude or the voting system?) Some
argue that the disproportionality of FPTP is unfair to small parties, in particular
for the Liberal Democrats, and call for a change in the voting system. Others
argue that the disproportionality is a result of changing patterns of voter
support, turn-out and constituency size, with the voting system not being the
sole cause of disproportionality per se. These various factors have a significant
impact on understanding proportionality, and need to be taken into account in
debates about disproportionality in recent UK General elections.
The impact of different voting systems on voter participation and turn-out is
perhaps the most complex criterion, about which interest is high but answers
are not straightforward. While there are many factors that impact on a persons
propensity to vote, recent research shows that sophisticated analysis is
required to look at the relationship between different factors. Voter knowledge,
interest and lack of perceived differences between parties have emerged as
important factors in voter participation, although the precise relationship is
not yet clear. One particular trend that has been identified across different
studies is the inequalities in turn-out at General elections, with turn-out
decreasing most rapidly amongst those being identified as being at greatest
risk of disengagement. Interventions to improve participation, particularly
amongst the least engaged, should target a range of contributory factors. John
Curtice has also suggested that since turn-out is sensitive to perceptions of a
close contest, the trend of voter turn-out may be reversed as British elections
become more competitive. It is certainly too simplistic to attribute turn-out
levels to particular voting systems or to blame the FPTP system specifically for
poor turn-out in the last few General elections. Turn-out has been relatively
low in most other elections in the UK since 1997 but more recently has been
improving across Scotland, Wales, London and for the European Parliamentary
elections.
We do not find a difference between PR systems and FPTP in terms of
delivering stable and effective governments although, with a greater number
of parties involved under PR, the political landscape can be more dynamic. In
the experience of the UK, coalition governments can be just as stable as single-
party governments. It is clear though that the new voting systems deliver
different kinds of government. Greater proportionality impacts on the nature
of government formation in that it almost always leads to either a minority
government, or necessarily coalition governments with an increased number
of small parties in government. There is debate about the appeal of coalition
governments (in how the prospect effects parties and voters before and during
elections and in how such governments decide on their policy platforms after
elections) and the consequential political implications, which are outside the
scope of our study and about which opinions vary.
One of the main benefits of PR, and in particular STV, is that voters have
a greater degree of choice in elections and a greater chance of their vote
counting in terms of who gets elected. The consequence is that more parties
become represented in assemblies and parliaments, and in the case of the
devolved jurisdictions, this has improved opportunities for local parties and
small parties to compete with the large three parties usually represented at
Westminster.
We do not find, on balance, any evidence to suggest that voters find one
voting system easier or more confusing than another voting system. Recent
performance of elections with the new voting systems did show encouraging
improvements, though knowledge and understanding of voting systems could
improve further. While FPTP is simpler in theory for voters and has less invalid
voting rates, ease of voting has not been an overwhelming problem in the new
systems when elections are not combined and when taking into account a
period for adjustment. Combined elections with different voting systems have
caused voter confusion and problems of invalid votes, largely due to the design
of ballot papers and information provided to voters, with some evidence of
a greater impact in socially deprived areas. While voters can adapt and learn
new voting systems, multiple systems operating in the same election increase
the importance of ballot paper design and provision of information to reduce
the potential for confusion. While some voter confusion may be inevitable in
combined elections, it is clear that ballot paper design also has a critical role to
play in mitigating voter confusion in combined elections, as well as the quality
of information provided to voters.
It is too difficult to draw conclusions on the quality of representation under
different voting systems because this is so dependent on individual views
and historical traditions. Whether a constituency is better represented by
one or several representatives, and whether list/regional representatives are
as legitimate as constituency representatives is highly debated in the UK
context. The change under PR systems in the nature of representation and the
legitimacy of elected representatives is likely to be topical in the debate for
Westminster.
On the criteria of social representation, the newly introduced voting systems
have improved the situation of women, although Labours positive action
policies have also been an important contributory factor. There has been
very little improvement in the representation of BME groups across all voting
systems and it is clear that for both ethnic and gender representation, party
behaviour in terms of selecting candidates is more critical than the voting
system alone.
It is also too difficult to draw conclusions on the impact on the nature of
political campaigning, due to the limited amount of research that is available.
It is worth noting the findings from Curtice et al that in their comparison,
countries with FPTP elections had more people reporting contact with a
political party than other countries. It is difficult to draw conclusions from the
limited research available about the experience of campaigning in the UK.
Administrative issues such as the provision of information, co-ordination,
consistency of practices (e.g. in counting votes), design of ballot papers and
innovations in the management of elections (e.g. electronic counting) are
increasingly important in determining the confidence people have in electoral
processes. Often problems arising from administrative issues are reflected
on the voting system, or vice versa, but it is clear that a complex range of
factors impact on the success of an election. However, the impact of improved
administration should not be underestimated. Much of the progress made in
some of the more recent elections in devolved jurisdiction were attributed to
improved administration, while there were also examples of administrative
challenges resulting in a lack of confidence in some elections.