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40. Any information held that does not relate to the NIR will not be part of the NIR and will not be available to NIR users. Conversely, any NIR information that does not relate to the needs of other users of these systems, such as DWP staff, will not be viewable or accessible in any way by such staff.

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Oh come on.

Taken to its logical conclusion, this means field- (not record-) level access control, also managed at some roles-based level across multiple linked (legacy) databases and agencies, delivering a real-time service. The implied increase in complexity over the "single, new, clean database" is staggering.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Home Office has the capacity to even commission such a system, let alone implement or manage it. It can't even successfully pass legal records between Magistrates Courts, or protect the Police National Computer from illegal access.

Are we are expected to just take it on trust that the LEAST organised Department of the whole government (which can't even keep track of its own staff, let alone 1,000 prisoners) will be able to pull off this fantasy system?

The consequences of failure are going to be *much* worse, with all your personal data being mixed in with data from the various other agencies. HO seems to be claiming it will not only be able to 'supercharge' several legacy sytems, but perfectly segregate AND secure data as well.

Ministers are either delusional, monumentally arrogant and stupid - or lying.

Take your pick.

Posted by Phil Booth on 2007-01-07 06:48:01.
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